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ABSTRACT 
 
Detecting Malicious VBScripts Using Anomaly Host Based IDS 
Based on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
By: Racha Mohamed El Sokkary 
 
Thesis Supervisors: Dr. Sherif El Kassas 
   Prof. Dr. Amr Goneid 
      Department of Computer Science, AUC 
 
Intrusion detection research over the last twenty years has focused on the threat of 
individuals illegally hacking into systems. Nowadays, intrusion threat to computer 
systems has changed radically. Instead of dealing with hackers, most current works 
focus on defending the system against code-driven attacks.  Today’s web script codes 
such as VBScript are receiving increasing focus as a backdoor for attacking many 
computers through e-mail attachments or infected web sites. The nature of these 
malicious codes is that they can spread widely causing serious damages to many 
applications. Moreover, the majority of anti-virus tools used today are able to detect 
known attacks but are unable to detect new and unknown  attacks.  
The work in this thesis presents an Anomaly host based Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) that provides protection against web attacks from malicious VBScripts. The 
core of the system treats anomalies as outliers and this IDS model uses a Multivariate 
Statistical technique, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the 
dimensionality of the problem while keeping the major principal components of 
benign instances.  Hence, the system can easily filter malicious scripts that deviate 
from normal behavior and allow for normal scripts to bypass; so any future or 
unknown VBScript attacks are effectively captured while maintaining a low rate of 
false alarms. 
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Chapter1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Computer security aims to protect an organization valuable’s resources from 
unauthorized access, tampering of data, and denial of service. One broad definition of a 
secure computer system is given by Garfinkel and Spafford [7] as “the one that can be 
depended upon to behave as it is expected to”. This concept can be referred to as trust : a 
system can be trusted if it can preserve and protect its data. 
Another important definition used is that security process can be grouped into three 
distinct phases, such as prevention, detection, and response [39]. 
· Prevention: is the first line of defense for capturing known threats and preventing 
malicious attacks. 
· Detection: is a continual reporting and monitoring for the appearance of new 
threats. 
· Response: is the immediate action to minimize damage by locating and 
neutralizing the source of threats. 
Thus, a secure computer system is based on the realization of confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability [4]: 
· Confidentiality requires that information be accessible only to those authorized for 
it. 
· Integrity requires that information remain unaltered by accident or malicious 
attempts. 
· Availability means that the computer system remains working without denial of 
access and provides resources to authorized users when they need it. 
 
Despite the widespread of computer use in the current information era with the 
proliferation of applications that progressively depend on e-commerce; most deployed 
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computer systems have become vulnerable to various kinds of attacks and break-ins. 
Attacks on Computer infrastructures have become a serious problem as they cause 
various types of damages and significant losses ranging from harming database integrity 
to destroying entire computer systems. According to Dorothy Denning in [1], most 
existing systems have security flaws that render them susceptible to intrusions, 
penetrations, and other forms of abuse. Threats to computer security can be categorized 
as in [22] to errors and omissions 1, fraud and theft2, malicious hackers3, and malicious 
codes4. 
 
As a society, the rapid access and processing of information over the Internet has 
exacerbated the problem of unauthorized access and tampering with data. Furthermore, 
network connectivity has increased the number and severity of these attacks. It not only 
provides access to larger and varied resources of data, but also provides an access path to 
                                                 
1 These are important threats to data and systems’ integrity. Users, data entry clerks, and systems’ operators make 
errors that crash a system and create vulnerabilities. 
 
2 Individuals may use a computer to steal small amounts of money from large financial accounts. Financial 
systems are not the only ones at risk. Systems that control access to any material or informational resources are 
targets such as, inventory and school grading systems. Computer fraud and theft can be committed both by 
insiders (authorized users of the system) or outsiders. 
 
3 The term malicious hackers, sometimes called crackers, refer to those who break into computers without 
authorization. Much of the rise of hackers’ activity is often attributed to increase in connectivity in both 
government and industry. The hacker threat should be considered in terms of current and potential future damage. 
Although current losses due to hackers’ attacks are significantly smaller than losses due to insiders’ theft and 
sabotage, the hacking problem is becoming more serious. 
 
4 Malicious code refers to Viruses, Worms, and Trojans that can attack both personal computers and other 
platforms. Viruses and worms do not need human intervention and are capable of replicating to other systems. By 
the time they are discovered, it may be impossible to trace their origin or the extent of the infection. Trojan horses 
by definition do not replicate, and are programmed to perform destructive activities triggered by a condition 
precompiled in its program. Actual costs attributed to the presence of malicious code results in system outages and 
wasting time repairing the systems. 
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the data from virtually anywhere on the network making the data residing on computer 
systems vulnerable to theft and corruption [11].  
 
Nowadays, most intruders have become skilled at determining and exploiting 
systems’ weaknesses to increase privileges of systems’ attacks. Damaging 
intrusions can occur in a matter of seconds by overcoming the password 
authentication mechanisms designed to protect systems. Moreover, intruders can 
hide their presence by installing modified versions of system monitoring and 
administration commands and by erasing their tracks in audit logs [2], [11]. The 
following Figure 1. 1 describes the history of attacks and illustrates the relationship 
between the relative sophistication of attacks and attackers from the 1980’s to the 
present. The knowledge required by intruders to launch known methods of attacks 
is decreasing. Today anyone can attack a network due to the widespread and easy 
availability of intrusion tools [11]. 
 
 
Figure 1. 1 : Attack sophistication versus intruder technical knowledge [11]. 
 
Recently trends indicate that the most costly intrusions are being perpetrated by mobile 
codes rather than individual hack- in attempts. The need for dynamic content and feature-
rich Web sites over the Internet has led to the adoption of mobile codes such as Java 
applets, Activex controls, and Script codes (e.g. Java script, VBScript, .. etc.) [23]. 
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However, these mobile codes present a serious security threat today that merits 
considerable attention and resources to counteract. Security flaws and holes have been 
discovered in virtually every single mobile code platform, making the outcomes of their 
execution involve system modifications, Invasion of privacy, and denial of service [10].  
 
One class of these mobile code threats that has proven particularly powerful and 
troublesome is malicious script codes. They are developed in scripting language, such as 
VBScript; they run on their respective interpreters residing in Web browsers or MS 
Office applications causing serious damages to various applications. Moreover, these 
attack scripts can provide hackers an easy back door entrance into the system by tricking 
unwitting users into downloading them from infected e-mail and web sites. In August, 
2000, four of the top six malicious code threats on Symantec's Antiviral Research 
Center's Web page [21] were active-scripting based attacks, including: VBS.Stages.A, 
Wscript.KakWorm, VBS.LoveLetter, and VBS.Network [23].  
These forms of malicious VBScripts are really the new types of intrusion; simply 
disabling their capabilities in browsers and mailers will not adequately address the 
problem because active scripting is used pervasively in most Web pages. That’s why 
VBScript was chosen as an important area to investigate and focus on in this research. 
  
Several layers of defense are used to capture malicious scripts while they are acting 
against the system. Firewalls5, security patches6, and virus scanners7 are examples of 
                                                 
5  It is a system designed to prevent unauthorized access to or from a private network. Firewalls can be 
implemented in both hardware and software, or a combination of both. Firewalls are frequently used to prevent 
unauthorized Internet users from accessing private networks connected to the Internet, especially intranets. All 
messages entering or leaving the intranet pass through the firewall, which examines each message and blocks 
those that do not meet the specified security criteria [5], [6]. 
 
6  Security patches are operating systems updates to fix the security holes that malicious software exploits. 
Traditionally, security patches were reactively developed to address known security holes detected by attacks on 
the operating system. Nowadays, O/S developers employ systematic testing methodologies to discover and 
mitigate the system security. Similar to virus scanners, security patches protect systems only when they have 
been written, distributed and applied to host systems. Until then, systems remain vulnerable and attacks can 
spread widely [19]. 
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these primary lines of defenses used to protect information systems from breaches and   
intrusions [37], [39].  
 
In many environments, Virus scanners are used to protect against these malicious mobile 
codes. Commercial virus scanners are mostly signature based using embedded strings in 
software to identify malicious from benign code [21], [37]. The main drawback of virus 
scanners is that they are effective against known attacks but are unable to effectively 
detect and prevent new types of attacks. Therefore, virus scanners require frequent 
updating of their signature databases; otherwise the scanners become useless [37]. Today 
many virus scanners employ a combination of heuristics to detect viruses. The heuristics 
can be put into two categories: Static heuristics and dynamic heuristics [41]. Static 
heuristics8 go through a file by analyzing its structure, and architecture as well as some 
indicators from its code to determine the likelihood of an infection. On the other hand, 
dynamic heuristics9 set up a controlled virtual environment in which they run the program 
and observe its behavior to see if there is any malicious activity. The technique of 
maintaining a virus signature database and then checking all files against it, works pretty 
well for known viruses but fairs poorly against new ones simply because chances are that 
they would not match any of the known patterns. Thus, heuristic anti-virus software is 
only as good as its signature database is kept updated of new viruses [42], [43].  
 
Computer systems are likely to remain insecure for sometime; therefore, security 
measures must be taken in order to detect break-ins. This motivates the need for 
improving detection by developing more secure systems that are resilient to attacks.  
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) fill this role and usually form the last line of defense 
against security breaches. They are useful not only in detecting successful break- ins, but 
                                                                                                                                        
7 A type of antivirus program that searches a system for virus signatures that have attached to executable 
programs and applications such as e-mail clients. A virus scanner can either search all executables when a 
system is booted or scan a file only when a change is made to the file as viruses will change the data in a file. 
8 For static heuristics, signatures are code segments of already known viruses and other patterns of malicious 
virus like code. 
9 For dynamic heuristics, signatures are malicious requests to the operating system for patterns of malicious 
activity. 
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also in monitoring attempts to breach security. Thus, they provide important information 
for timely countermeasures [2]. 
Existing intrusion detection techniques fall in two major categories: Misuse detection 
(also referred to as Signature recognition), and Anomaly detection.  
Misuse detection is similar to Virus Scanners; they also make use of signature scanning 
by looking for unique data fingerprints that identify certain types of attacks. The 
weakness of this approach is that it cannot detect novel attacks whose signatures are 
unknown. On the other hand, Anomaly detection detects both known and novel intrusions 
by establishing a profile of normal behavior and observing any abnormal deviation from 
this behavior [12]. 
 
The goal of this research is to provide protection against web script attacks from 
malicious VBScripts. Thus, this significant limitation of misuse detection was tackled in 
this research by focusing on the use of Anomaly host based IDS, so the system can easily 
detect VBScripts with malicious behavior onto the host and allow for normal scripts to 
bypass while reducing the rate of false alarms.   
A key benefit of the introduced approach is that it handles a class of malicious VBScript 
attacks rather than specific instances, i.e. it is not a signature-based detection. As a result, 
it addresses future and unknown active scripting attacks. Moreover, its capability is 
demonstrated to detect unknown VBScript attacks in emails attachments and Web 
programs.  
 
Another advantage is that the proposed anomaly host based IDS uses a Multivariate 
statistical technique, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [57], to reduce the problem 
dimensionality by identifying patterns of benign behavior and expressing the data in such 
a way to highlight their similarities and differences. Thus, the IDS could easily 
differentiate between normal and malicious VBScripts, and capture any future malicious 
scripts that exhibit different or abnormal profile. 
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1.2 Problem Statement   
 
It has been noticed over the past few years that the number of attacks based on malicious 
VBScripts has increased dramatically, making it one of the main threats to web based 
systems [10]. Recently there have been some high profile incidents with malicious e-mail 
attachments such as I LOVE YOU [40], [67], Slammer [65], and Netsky [66] viruses and 
their clones. These malicious VBScripts are simply transmitted as a source code in e-mail 
or web sites and run on the fly causing serious damages to powerful applications such as 
word processing, and web programs. This fact implies that VBScript codes are receiving 
increasing focus for attacking many computers and it is significant to provide protection 
against attacks from malicious VBScripts. Hence, the main problem addressed by this 
thesis is to develop an anomaly host based IDS that uses a multivariate statistical 
technique such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to detect attacks from malicious 
VBScripts. 
 
1.3 Thesis Objective 
 
The work presented in this thesis will address an area that received little attention despite 
its growing importance, namely, the increasing number of attacks utilizing security 
vulnerabilities in VBScript to infect many web pages [23], [45].  The objective of this 
research is to study the nature of these attacks as well as to propose an efficient anomaly 
host based system (IDS) to tackle the mentioned problem. This system is based on a 
classification approach utilizing Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a Multivariate 
Statistical Technique that identifies patterns in a large data set by highlighting their 
similarities and differences. The reason of choosing PCA is that the data of the mentioned 
problem is typically to be of high dimension, so PCA is applied to reduce the 
dimensionality of the data without sacrificing its valuable information. PCA is used as a 
feature extractor to extract patterns that will be used by the classifier, which follows the 
feature extractor, to differentiate between normal and malicious script. Therefore, the 
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introduced anomaly host based IDS could easily differentiate between normal and 
malicious VBScripts, and could capture any VBScript with malicious behavior.  
 
This work is based on two important hypotheses: 
* The 1st hypothesis is based on the observation that the majority of malicious codes 
exhibit different behaviors in comparison to normal codes, at the same time the codes 
within each group share some common patterns. 
  
* The 2nd hypothesis assumes that the code patterns exhibited in malicious VBScripts are 
unique to attack codes and record very low presence in normal VBScripts. 
 
The following are the steps taken to achieve the thesis objective. 
1. The first step is studying the behavior of VBScript  codes (Malicious and 
Normal script). The concise nature of VBScript language, allowed studying the 
normal patterns (features) of VBScript codes and detecting malicious script that 
deviates from normal profile to prove the validity of the 1st assumption. 
2. The second step is Pattern Identification (feature extraction): this step is 
concerned with identifying and extracting patterns that characterize benign 
codes from malicious scripts. In order to do so, PCA statistical analysis is used 
to develop a feature extractor to extract measurements that are invariant or 
insensitive to detect malicious script that deviates from Normal behaviors. 
3. The third step is the Attack Classifier: An attack classifier (based on Euclidean 
distance) is used to learn the best combination of feature elements in order to 
categorize the incoming script into normal or malicious code. 
4. The final step is Results analysis and validation: this step accomplishes the 
thesis objective by analyzing the extracted results to show the validity of the 
hypotheses proposed in the theoretical part. So, it measures the system’s 
efficiency such as the detection rate of malicious script and the percentage of 
false alarms by conducting two types of experiments for training and testing the 
system. Experiment over unseen VBScripts (Cross Validation) [35], and 
experiment over seen VBScripts. 
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1.4 Thesis Organization 
 
The thesis is divided into 6 chapters. Chapter 2 describes background and puts this 
research into perspective. It discusses types of intrusion detection systems and 
requirements for efficient IDS.  
Chapter 3 discusses related work in the area of anomaly host based IDS that uses 
multivariate statistical technique for extracting patterns for detection.  
Chapter 4 describes the introduced Anomaly host based intrusion-detection system, and 
its components, this IDS uses Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for extracting 
features which are used to differentiate between Normal and Malicious VBScript. 
Chapter 5 provides details of experiments and tests run on the system and the results of 
these tests.  
Chapter 6 provides conclusions and future work expectations. 
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Chapter 2: Intrusion Detection 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As we increasingly rely on information infrastructures to support critical operations in 
banking, transportation, and telecommunication, intrusions into information systems have 
become a significant threat to our society with potentially severe consequences. An 
intrusion compromises the security of an information system through various means 
including denial of service, and information probing. 
 
It is significant that the security mechanisms of any system are set up against intrusions 
and unauthorized access through prevention, detection, and response [39]. So, building a 
reliable computer system to detect intrusions resembles in many aspects a natural 
immune system that protects the body from dangerous foreign attackers [13]. This field 
of research is called Intrusion Detection; it complements prevention mechanism such as 
firewalls, cryptography, and authentication to capture intrusions while they are acting on 
the information system. This chapter will cover the concept of Intrusion Detection 
System and its different types. Finally, it will highlight the use of Anomaly host based 
IDS to prevent and detect malicious attacks. 
 
2.2 What is an IDS 
 
An earlier study conducted by Anderson [3] uses the term ‘threat’ in the same sense as 
‘intrusion’ and defines it to be the potential possibility of a deliberate unauthorized 
attempt to: 
· Access information. 
· Manipulate information, or. 
· Render a system unreliable or unusable. 
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Another definition, introduced by Edward Amoroso [8], is  that “Intrusion detection is the 
process of identifying and responding to malicious activity targeted at computing and 
networking resources”. 
The definitions above are general enough to encompass all the threats mentioned earlier. 
 
 
2.2.1 The Basic Concepts of Intrusion Detection 
The concept of ‘Intrusion detection’ can be clarified through the introduction of three 
basic, yet critical processes [8]: 
Monitor: IDSs examine and process information about the target system activities. Many 
technical and operational issues arise in this monitoring process including timeliness of 
detection, confidence in information obtained, and processing power required to keep up 
with the monitored activity. 
Report: IDSs report information about monitored systems into a system security and 
protection entity. This functional entity can be embedded in the monitoring component or 
can be conducted separately. 
Respond: The purpose of intrusion detection is to reduce security risk. When related 
information is made available, an associated response function initiates mitigation 
activities. Response actions introduces myriad of factors related to the timeliness and 
appropriateness of the activities initiated by the IDS to deal with an incident. 
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2.2.2 A Generic Intrusion-Detection System 
 
PROBES 
 
DATABASE 
 
CONFIGURATION 
 
DETECTOR 
 
COUNTERMEASURES 
 
SYSTEM 
AUDITS 
ALARMS 
ACTIONS 
 
 
Figure 2. 1 : A simple Intrusion Detection System [9]. 
An IDS can be described at a very macroscopic level as a detector that processes 
information coming into the system to be protected. As shown in Figure 2. 1, this detector 
uses three kinds of information: long term information related to the technique used to 
detect intrusions (a knowledge base of attacks), configuration information about the 
current state of the system, and audit information describing the events that are happening 
on the system [9]. 
The role of the detector is to eliminate unneeded information from the audit trail. It then 
presents a synthetic view of the current security state of the system. A decision is then 
taken to evaluate the probability that these states can be considered symptoms of 
intrusions or vulnerabilities. A countermeasure component can take corrective action to 
either prevent the threats from being executed or changing the state of the system back to 
a secure state [8], [9]. 
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2.2.3 Characteristics of Intrusion Detection Systems 
Figure 2. 2 introduces five concepts that classify IDSs [9]: 
 
Intrusion Detection  
System 
Detection 
 Method 
Behaviour Based 
Knowledge Based  
Passive Alerting 
Active Alerting  
Host Log Files 
Network Packets  
Application Log File 
IDS Sensor Alert  
State Based 
Transition Based 
Continuous Monitoring 
Periodic Analysis 
Behaviour on  
Detection 
Usage 
Frequency 
Detection 
Paradigm 
Audit Source 
Location 
Non-Perturbing Evaluation
Proactive Evaluation 
 
Figure 2. 2 : Characteristics of Intrusion Detection Systems [9]. 
 
· The detection method: describes the characteristics of the analyzer. When the IDS 
uses information about the normal behavior of the system, it is qualified as 
behavior based. Whereas when the IDS uses information about the attacks, it is 
qualified as knowledge based. 
· The behavior on detection: describes the response of the IDS to attacks. When it 
actively reacts to the attack by taking either corrective (closing holes), or pro-
active (logging out possible attackers, closing down services) actions, then the 
IDS is said to be active. If the IDS merely generates alarms (including paging) it 
is said to be passive. 
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· The audit source location: distinguishes IDSs based on the kind of input 
information they analyze. This input information can be audit trails on a host, 
network packets, application logs, or intrusion alerts generated by other IDSs. 
· The detection paradigm: describes the detection mechanism used by the IDS. IDS 
can evaluate states or transitions. In addition, this evaluation can be performed in 
a non-obtrusive way or by actively simulating the system to obtain a response. 
· The usage frequency: it has an orthogonal concept. Certain IDSs have real time 
continuous monitoring capabilities, whereas others have to be run periodically. 
2.2.4 Efficiency of intrusion detection systems 
Some measures are considered to evaluate the efficiency of IDSs [9]: 
· Accuracy: deals with the proper detection of attacks and the absence of false 
alarms. Inaccuracy occurs when an IDS flags as anomalous or an illegitimate 
action in the environment. 
· Performance: is the rate at which audit events are processed. If the performance 
of the IDS is poor, then real time detection is not possible 
· Completeness: is the property of an IDS to detect all attacks. Incompleteness 
occurs when the  IDS fails to detect an attack. This measure is much more difficult 
to evaluate than the others because it is impossible to have a global knowledge 
about attacks or abuses of privileges. 
· Fault tolerance: IDS should be resistant to attacks, especially denia l of service 
attacks. This is particularly important because most IDS have run above 
commercially available operating system or hardware, which are known to be 
vulnerable to attacks. 
· Timeliness: An IDS has to perform and propagate its analysis as quickly as 
possible in order to react before much damage has been done and also to prevent 
the attacker from subverting the audit source or the IDS itself. This implies more 
than the measure of performance because it, not only encompasses the processing 
speed of the IDS, but also the time required to propagate the information and react 
to it. 
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2.3 Classification of IDS 
There are different ways to classify an IDS; intrusion detection could be classified 
according to their method of detection or according to the type of the protected system : 
2.3.1 Classification based on the detection method [4], [9], [12]: 
2.3.1.1 Misuse Detection10 or detection by appearance. 
This method is also called “knowledge-based intrusion detection” [30] because it 
applies the knowledge accumulated about specific attacks and system 
vulnerabilities and use it to identify future intrusions. Similar to virus scanners, 
Misuse detection algorithms make use of signature scanning, looking for unique 
data fingerprints that identify certain types of attacks. It matches activities in an 
information system with these signatures and signal intrusions when there is a 
match. This approach requires previous knowledge of an attack and is rarely 
effective on new attacks [34]. The accuracy of this method is considered good. 
However, their completeness depends on the regular update of knowledge about 
attacks. 
 
· Advantages: This approach has very low rate of false alarms making it easy to 
understand the problem and take preventive or corrective measures. 
 
· Drawbacks: This method has the difficulty of gathering the required information 
on known attacks and keeping an up to date list of all new vulnerabilities. 
Moreover, maintenance of the knowledge base of the intrusion detection requires 
careful analysis of vulnerability making it a time consuming task. Knowledge 
                                                 
10 Commercial IDS systems that are widely in use today are based on these signature algorithms, such as NSM/ASIM 
NSM (Network Security Monitor) which is an intrusion detection system developed at the University of California-
Davis, and IDES/NIDES the Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) developed at SRI [53], [54].  
 
 21 
about attacks depends more on the operating system, version, platform, and 
application. So, the resulting IDS is closely tied to a given environment. 
2.3.1.2 Anomaly Detection or detection by behavior. 
This approach assumes that intrusions can be detected by observing a deviation 
from the normal behavior of the system or the users. The IDS compares the current 
activities with a model of expected behavior. When a deviation is observed, an 
alarm is generated. This means anything that does not correspond to a previously 
learned behavior, is considered intrusive. Therefore, the IDS might be complete, but 
judging its accuracy is a difficult issue [30].  
To address this shortcoming, Anomaly intrusion detection look for any activity that 
lies outside a certain prescribed range of "safe" activities, so it captures both known 
and unknown intrusions if the activity under test demonstrates a significant 
deviation from a norm profile. 
 
· Advantages: This approach can detect attempts to exploit new and unforeseen 
vulnerabilities. They are less dependent on the operating system. They also help 
to detect “abuse of privilege” types of attacks that do not actually involve 
exploitation of any security vulnerability.  
· Drawbacks: The high false alarm rate is the main disadvantage of this approach 
because the entire scope of the behavior of an information system may not be 
covered during the learning phase. Moreover, the information system can 
undergo attacks at the same time the IDS is learning the behavior. As a result, the 
behavior profile will contain intrusive behavior, which is not detected as 
anomalous. 
 
2.3.2 Classification based on the type of the protected system [9], [12]: 
Also depending on the method that can probe the system, IDS can also be classified as 
host based or network based [9]. 
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2.3.2.1 Host based systems  
It bases their decision on information obtained from a single host (usually audit 
trails). 
2.3.2.2 Network based systems  
It obtains data by monitoring the traffic in the network to which the systems are 
connected. 
2.4 Different Approaches to anomaly host-based IDS 
There is extensive research work in the literature on the security of network-based 
anomaly IDS, such as the use of Bayesian models [28], and the use of data mining for 
designing network anomaly IDSs [29] as well as the security of host-based Anomaly IDS 
[25].  As the work in this thesis uses Anomaly host based IDS to detect malicious 
VBScript attacks, so the following presents previous research in the area of Anomaly host 
based IDS. 
2.4.1 Analysis of sequences of system calls  
One of the first developments in Anomaly host based intrusion detection was introduced 
by Stephanie Forrest’s [13] which examines system processes for anomalous behavior 
and extracts a reference table containing all known benign sequences of system calls. 
These patterns are then used for live monitoring to check whether the sequences 
generated are listed in the table or not. If they do not, an alarm is generated. The 
application of this technique was shown viable for several Unix programs such as 
“sendmail”, “lpr”, and “ftpd”. 
A research group at the Columbia University [15] extended Forrest’s work [13] by 
formulating machine learning tasks on operating system calls’ sequences of normal and 
abnormal executions of the Unix sendmail program. The results show that system calls 
can be used to detect intrusions even with different intrusion detection algorithms. 
They conducted two sets of experiments. 
a. First, sequences of several consecutive system calls were extracted from sendmail 
traces and supplied to a machine-learning algorithm to learn the pattern of a 
normal sequence. 
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b. Second, a rule-learning program (RIPPER) was applied to the data to extract rules 
for predicting whether a sequence of system calls is normal or abnormal. 
However, the rules made by RIPPER can be erroneous. A post-processing 
algorithm that filters spurious prediction errors is used to scan and to determine if 
an intrusion has occurred.  
 
Jones and Li [14] recently built on Forrest’s method using sequences of system calls, but 
incorporated timing properties to create signatures that relate more closely and uniquely 
to the application. The time measure used is the time duration between sequence calls. 
Time distributions for each time interval between two calls in a unique sequence is 
computed, then high variance data is excluded to create a database of normal signatures 
that summarizes multiple measurements. The results show that by choosing appropriate 
analysis methods and experimentally adjusting the parameters, intrusions are effectively 
detected. 
There are two main problems to system calls approach for host based IDS, which inhibits 
their use in actual deployment: 
· The computational overhead for monitoring all system calls is very high which 
degrades the system performance. 
· The system calls are irregular by nature, which makes it difficult to differentiate 
between normal and malicious behaviors, and increases the false positive rate. 
 
2.4.2 Detection through the use of Neural Networks 
Neural Networks (NNs)11 have been identified as a very promising technique for 
addressing the high false positive rate characterizing intrusion detection systems [24]. 
The basic origin of this problem stems from the dynamic nature of systems and networks. 
                                                 
11 Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are programs designed to simulate the way a simple biological nervous 
system is believed to operate. They are based on simulated nerve cells or neurons joined together in a variety of 
ways to form networks. These networks have the capacity to learn, memorize and create relationships amongst 
data [26].  
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It is very easy for a legitimate traffic to be mistaken for an intrusion attempt, which may 
yield self- inflicted denial of service incidents. 
Multi layer perceptron network (MLP) [16] was proposed to examine applications at the 
process level in an attempt to detect anomalous behavior. The basic concept of this 
approach is the assumption that regardless of user characteristics and anomalous behavior 
at the application level, activities that are distinguishable and identifiable as anomalous 
will be generated at the process level as well. Results of MLP based intrusion detection 
systems demonstrate the suitability of using neural networks in layered detection 
architectures to verify alerts and minimize false positives [36]. 
One of the pioneer researches into the use of recurrent networks in anomaly IDS was the 
use of Elman networks [17], [36] in the analysis of program behavior. They are similar to 
the MLP with additional context nodes, which maintain a state of the system. The Elman 
network works by predicting the next sequence given a present input and the context. The 
actual next sequence is compared to the predicted sequence and the difference between 
them represents the measure of anomaly. 
The advantages of using Neural Networks are: 
· They cope well with noisy data, hence a potential reduction to false negative rate. 
· Their success does not depend on any statistical assumption about the nature of 
the underlying data, and they are easier to modify for new user communities. 
 
However, they have some problems. 
· First, a small threshold will result in false positives while a large threshold will 
result in irrelevant data as well as increase the chance of false negatives. 
· Second, the net topology is only determined after considerable trial and error. And 
third, the intruder can train the net during its learning phase 
 
The vast majority of NNs researches into IDS have been limited to the application of 
the multi layer perceptron network (MLP). Only recently has the unsupervised 
learning model of the self-organizing map (SOM) [36], [68] been investigated but 
only to user behavior analysis. Therefore, future anomaly IDS researches using NN 
should be focused on two distinct fronts:  
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· The investigation of other NNs topologies, especially recurrent networks. 
· Specialization of the functions of the NN detection engine. 
· And the extension of NNs monitoring domains to include more system level 
inputs (program behavior) in addition to the present focus on user behavior analysis. 
2.4.3 Detection through the use of Data Mining 
There has also been a growing interest in the use of data mining techniques in Anomaly 
IDS to detect previously unseen malicious programs. Data mining12 methods detect 
patterns such as code signatures in large amount of data and use these patterns to detect 
future instances in similar data [32].  
 
A research introduced by Schultz et. al [33] aims to explore a number of standard data 
mining techniques over a set of training data to generate a rule based classifier to detect 
new malicious executables. The data mining results were compared to a traditional 
signature based algorithm and showed that the data mining method more than doubles the 
current detection rates for new malicious executables. 
 
Another work presented in [32] uses a Malicious Email Filter (MEF) incorporated into 
procmail that filters multiple attachments in e-mails by using detection models obtained 
from the use of data mining over known malicious attachments.  
The MEF system has three capabilities: 
· It detects known and unknown malicious attachments. 
· It provides a method for monitoring and measuring the spread of malicious 
attachments. 
· It also allows for the efficient propagation of detection models from a central 
server. 
 
                                                 
12 Data mining is a process that uses a variety of data analysis tools to discover patterns and look at numerous 
multidimensional data relationships concurrently, highlighting those that are dominant or exceptional [29].  
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One major problem in applications of data mining to intrusion detection is that detection 
models are produced off- line because the learning algorithms are applied to tremendous 
amounts of archived audit data. These models can naturally be used for off-line intrusion 
detection, or analyzing audit data off- line after intrusions have run their course. However, 
effective intrusion detection should happen in real-time, as intrusions take place, to 
minimize security compromises. 
 
Moreover, a data mining based IDS is significantly more complex than a traditional 
system. The main cause for this is that data mining methods impose a heavy load on the 
resources of the system under protection. The use of physical memory and processing 
power significantly increases as the size of the database used increases, thus yielding a 
serious trade-off between accuracy of detection and performance of the system and its 
applications. Therefore, the space complexity of data mining algorithms needs to be 
improved without sacrificing accuracy. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the role of Intrusion detection as an important component of the 
security controls and mechanisms provided in a system. IDS usually forms the last line of 
defense against security threats, so it detects breaches that cannot be easily detected using 
other methods.  
It was shown that existing Intrusion detection techniques fall in two major categories: 
Anomaly detection, and Misuse detection. Misuse detection is known as a signature based 
system which has a limitation in that they cannot detect novel attacks. This limitation is 
overcome by using Anomaly detection techniques as a complement. So, Anomaly 
detection can detect both known and unknown attacks if they demonstrate departure from 
a norm profile. Two types of IDS are in use for both anomaly and misuse detection, such 
as host based, and network based. Host based systems perform host- level monitoring 
while Network based systems monitor the traffic in the network to which the systems are 
connected.  
As the work in this thesis uses anomaly host based IDS for detecting malicious VBScript 
codes that deviate from the normal behavior. Thus, this chapter focuses on anomaly host 
based IDS as an intrusion detection technique; moreover, the next chapter will give a 
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survey of statistical techniques based on anomaly host based IDS that are used by other 
systems for detecting intrusions. It also outlines related work in the literature that studies 
the identification of attacks through the analysis of the source code. 
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Chapter 3: Related Work 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Today with the increasing complexity in business needs, most web hosts design their web 
pages to deliver dynamic contents and rich features to Internet clients using some of the 
many available Internet scripting languages. Web script codes, such as VBScript or 
JavaScript [10], [44], [45] are programming languages embedded in web pages to provide 
robust functionality to Internet applications. The increased dependence on these web 
scripts was met with an increased threat on the underlying systems security.  
 
Researchers have found a number of security holes and vulnerabilities that are capable of 
exploiting web systems. Web script attacks, such as the propagation of malicious scripts 
through e-mail attachments especially new and unseen ones have rapidly increased and 
continue to be a leading security threat on the Internet. Recently, there have been some 
high profile incidents, such as “I LOVE YOU” [40], [67], Netsky [66] and its clones 
transmitted with malicious e-mail attachments that caused significant damage in a short 
time frame.  
 
Web Script codes are transmitted as source codes over the Internet and executed on any 
target machine, accordingly they are hardware independent, while programs stored in 
binary form have limited potential to be used over the Internet due to their hardware 
dependence. Moreover, these script codes run mostly on the windows platform ( i.e. the 
world’s most dominant operating system) to access applications and system resources. 
Thus, they can independently migrate from host to host causing serious damages to 
various applications. For these reasons, the behavior and structure of source code attacks 
is receiving an increasing focus in the literature. 
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Based on the above, it is obvious that studying the security of web scripts such as 
VBScript is an important research area. The research presented in this thesis thus focuses 
on studying the behavior of VBScript attacks and proposes an Anomaly host-based IDS 
system in order to prevent potential VBScript attacks. 
 
This chapter will review prior work in two related areas in security research that directly 
correlates to the proposed work in the thesis: 
1- The analysis of source codes for attacks detection. 
2- The use of statistical techniques (for analysis) on source code to develop an 
anomaly host-based IDS. 
3.2 Detecting attacks through source code analysis 
 
Source code analysis has become so significant as it is used in the assessment of code 
quality to find subtle defects in the code that the compiler might miss. Moreover, it is 
used in the analysis of Web script codes that are transmitted as source codes over the 
Internet and executed on the fly on different hardware platforms causing serious damages 
to various applications. Among the many software languages that are used for script 
coding (VBScript and Javascript) [23], [44] dominate the vast majority of Internet script 
utilization, and while they received very little attention in the literature till recently [45]. 
Detecting attacks of programs written in C language received significant focus [19]. The 
following section will highlight the main developments in the area of detecting attack 
source codes written in C language. 
There have been a series of studies [50] that looked at modeling normal or malicious 
profiles by considering different properties of activity data such as: 
· The frequency property (number of consecutive occurrence of individual events). 
· The duration property (time of an event). 
· and the ordering property (sequence or transition of events). 
in order to detect intrusions. The results of these studies showed that the duration 
property is not sufficient to detect intrusions. Moreover, the ordering property of multiple 
audit events, which provides additional advantages to the frequency property for 
detecting intrusions are not effective unless the scalability problem of complex data is too 
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small. Thus, intrusion detection techniques based on the frequency property provides 
viable solution that produces good intrusion detection with low computational overhead. 
And as a result, the work presented in this thesis was chosen to focus on the frequency 
property in all the statistical techniques. 
 
3.2.1 Attacks exploiting buffer-overflow systems vulnerability 
Few researches have been developed to detect vulnerabilities in C language. Wagner et 
al. [56] have developed a system to detect buffer overflows by using static analysis in 
programs written in C language. Their approach treats C strings as an abstract data type 
accessed through the library routines and models buffers as pairs of integer ranges (size 
and current length), while the detection problem is formulated as an integer constraint 
problem. The library functions are modeled in terms of how they modify the size and 
length of strings. This method was concluded to be imprecise because it gives both false 
positives and false negatives. 
One of the recent developments as well in that area was introduced by Larochelle [55] 
who presented a lightweight annotation assisted static analysis based on LCLint. This 
technique exploits information provided in programmer’s semantic comments to detect 
buffer overflow vulnerabilities. The annotations are treated as regular C comments by the 
compiler, but recognized as syntactic entities by LCLint. The work was concluded to be 
useful in detecting that kind of attacks. A significant drawback though, is the focus on 
only one kind of attacks. The technique has several limitations if applied over a wider 
range of known attacks, such as the number of false warnings is quite high, and more 
annotations are needed to be inserted in the code to facilitate the checking of constraints. 
Moreover detection rate were not studied for testing over unknown attacks [55]. 
3.2.2 Attacks increasing system privileges 
Cunningham and Stevenson [19] introduced a novel approach that accurately verifies 
script codes of UNIX attacks developed in C (or UNIX shell scripts). By detecting and 
differentiating those attacks that increase privileges from normal source codes. Although 
intrusion detection research is focused on detecting attacks after they occur, the technique 
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used by Cunningham and Stevenson resembles virus detection as they detect attacks 
before the script is run. This work has much in common with the virus detection 
literature. The most common technique used is signature verification, in which scripts’ 
signatures are scanned and compared with a list of those which are known to be 
representative of attacks. 
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Figure 3. 1 : The System Architecture of Detecting Source Code of Attacks [19]. 
 
The above Figure 3. 1 depicts Cunningham and Stevenson’s proposed system 
architecture. The system intercepts incoming data streams and processes them to 
determine whether it is an attack or benign stream before reporting to the operating 
system. It is composed of two main functions: 
1. Language identification 
2. Attack detection 
The language identifier is responsible for determining the language type of the incoming 
stream. It bases the decision on finding keywords used for the specific script language 
(e.g. for C, it looks for keywords such as printf or scanf). The benefit of that structure is 
that it allows for expanding on the system by adding identification for many languages 
(not just C) as proposed by the authors. 
In the heart of the system lays an attack detection module which is language specific. For 
example, the C language detection module is triggered if the output of the language 
classifier shows the incoming stream to be C script. The detection module first extracts 
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features from the incoming script to use it for determining whether there is a potential 
attack or not. Cunningham and Stevenson showed that by extracting the adequate features 
from the script, the extracted features can be used to differentiate between malicious and 
benign scripts. 
 
The feature extractor is essentially a language-specific parser that gathers statistics about 
the script and stores it in sets of triples (regular expression, code category, encoding 
scheme). Each time the regular expression records a match, the feature statistic is updated 
to reflect higher utilization of that specific feature. 
A vector of feature statistics is then fed into a neural-network based classifier that is used 
to learn the best combination of feature elements in order to categorize the source into 
normal or malicious code. Therefore, if an attack is detected the IDS is notified, and the 
user can interpret the attacker’s actions for the intended target. 
The work in the thesis represents an extension on Cunningham’s work. A system of 
similar architecture is used to detect attacks by monitoring VBScript source code. It uses 
a feature extractor for extracting features from VBScript codes and an attack classifier to 
determine a malicious from normal VBScript code by using statistical analysis technique 
such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [57]. 
3.3 Statistical-based anomaly detection techniques 
 
Cunningham and Stevenson [19] proposed a neural-network based system in order to 
classify the nature of the attack. In general, once the features are extracted from the 
incoming data stream, there are many techniques that can be used to classify and 
determine whether the code is normal or malicious.  
In addition to the use of neural networks, several statistical based detection techniques 
were studied in the literature. Such techniques use statistical properties (e.g., mean and 
variance) of normal activities to build a norm profile and employ statistical tests in order 
to determine whether the observed activities deviate significantly from the norm profile 
[49]. 
Statistical-based anomaly detection techniques are inherently capable of handling 
variations and noises involved in activities of information system. A norm profile 
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represents the features of normal activities’ scripts. It should be able though to distinguish 
between expected variations in benign code from truly anomalous behavior. 
 
3.3.1 Statistical process control 
There are two main techniques in statistical process that are designed to handle different 
scenarios, but usually work together in the process control [48], [49]:  
· Univariate statistical process control 
It explores each variable in a data set, separately. It looks at the range of values, as 
well as the central tendency of these values, so it describes the pattern of response 
to the variable.  
An observation is signaled if it does not conform to the normal profile, which is 
created using historical data. This signal may be due to a shift in the process mean 
and/or a shift in the process variation. Since only one variable is considered at a 
time, its relationship with other variables is ignored, and consequently some 
important information is lost. 
Earlier studies on statistical-based anomaly detection techniques are based on a 
statistical technique developed for (Intrusion Detection Expert System/Next 
Generation Intrusion Detection Expert System) IDES/NIDES [53], [54]. This is a 
Univariate technique that computes test statistics of a normal distribution using 
data on a single measure. This technique has several drawbacks [48], [49]: 
- First of all, the technique is sensitive to the normality assumption. If data 
on a measure are not normally distributed, the technique yields a high false 
alarm rate. 
- Second, it is based on a Univariate technique where a norm profile is built 
for only one measure of activities in information systems. On the other 
hand, intrusions often affect multiple measures of activities collectively. 
Anomalies resulting from intrusions may cause deviations on multiple 
measures in a collective manner rather than through separate 
manifestations on individual measures. Thus, Multivariate technique is a 
more promising area for research. 
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· Multivariate statistical process control 
It deals with all the variables simultaneously. Multivariate quality control methods 
not only can extract information on individual characteristics, but also can 
identify and monitor the correlation structure among them. 
A signal is generated to an event when any of the process variables falls outside 
the bound of process variation established by the historical data. An event is also 
signaled when relationships among the variables change [49].  
 
A multivariate statistical quality monitoring is composed of two phases [48], [49]: 
Phase I: Estimate process parameters. 
Stage 1: Retrospective examination of subgroup behavior: it is the stage 
where historical observations are analyzed, normal behaviors are extracted 
and the control parameters of the process are estimated. So, a norm profile 
is set up with the control parameters 
Stage 2: Prospective examination of future subgroups: it is the stage where 
control charts are used to detect abnormal events using the norm profile. If 
any anomalous phenomenon is detected during this stage, the parameters, 
estimated in the 1st phase, are rechecked and re-estimated to build a new 
norm profile. After several iterative procedures, the most suitable profile is 
found and used in the 2nd phase to control the process in real environment 
Phase II: Use the results of the 1st phase as process parameters. 
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Difference between Univariate and Multivariate Technique: 
 
 
A miss by separate 
univariate tests 
Control limits from a correlated Multivariate test like the X2 test 
Control limits from separate Univariate tests 
 
Figure 3. 2 :  Differences between the control limits of separate Univariate tests and the control 
limit of a Multivariate test [46]. 
 
Univariate control does not take into account that variables are dependent from each other 
and their correlation information can be very important for understanding process 
behavior. Thus, this method fails in detection because abnormality information is 
concealed inside the relationship among the variables. Moreover, it cannot detect 
abnormal behavior efficiently in noisy environment as well. In contrast, the multivariate 
control method has several benefits. It takes advantage of the correlation information and 
analyzes the data jointly. So, it provides an overall picture about the process change [46]. 
It is well understood as depicted in the above Figure 3. 2 that separate Univariate tests on 
individual variables can lead to misses caused by incorrect control limits of significant 
probabilities. 
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3.3.2 Multivariate statistical techniques in intrusion detection 
Multivariate process control techniques that are used in Intrusion Detection systems 
include [46], [51]: 
a. Hotelling’s T2 
b. chi-squared statistics 
c. and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
All these techniques are applied to intrusion detection for monitoring and detecting 
anomalies of a process in an information system. 
a. Hotelling's T2 Test 
Hotelling’s T2 [47] is a measure of the statistical distance from an observation to the 
mean estimate of the multivariate normal distribution. It is a widely used statistic for 
creating a multivariate control with individual observations. It combines information 
from all the variables in the process; so it provides an overall picture about the change of 
process. This technique is applied to intrusion detection for monitoring and detecting 
anomalies of a process in an information system. 
Let us consider the computational procedure of Hotelling’s T 2 : 
Xi = (Xi1,Xi2, . . .,Xip) denote an observation of P measures on a process or system at time 
i. When the process is operating normally (in control), the population of X follows a 
multivariate normal distribution with the mean vector µ and the covariance matrix S. 
Using a data sample of size n, the sample mean vector x  in equation (1) and the sample 
covariance matrix S in equation (2) are usually used to estimate µ and S.  
x = ( x 1, x 2,…, x p).     (1) 
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A large value of T2 in equation (3) indicates a large deviation of the observation Xi from 
the in control population. So it signals that a statistically significant shift in the mean has 
occurred as soon as it is larger than a threshold limit.  
 
Related Work 
Nong ye [46] introduces the use of Hotelling’s T2 distribution to detect intrusive events 
by getting a norm profile when training the system with normal events. Based on this 
normal profile, abnormal activities can be detected in a testing event set.  
Hotelling’s T2 technique detects both counter-relationship and mean shift anomalies by 
focusing on the individual sample mean and the sample covariance matrix, which are the 
main control parameters of the norm profile. 
The performance of the Hotelling’s T2 test is examined on two sets of computer audit 
data: a small data set and a large multiday data set. 
For the small data set, the Hotelling’s T2 test signals all the intrusion session and 
produces no false alarms for the normal session. 
For the large data set, the Hotelling’s T2 test signals 92 percent of the intrusion sessions 
while producing no false alarms for the normal session. 
b. The Chi square test 
Chi Square test X2 [47], [48] is another multivariate statistical analysis technique based 
on the chi square distribution.  It is used for the ‘goodness-of-fit’ test because it checks 
whether there is a close fit between the data (O = Observed frequency) and the theory (E 
=  Expected frequency).  X2 determines whether the differences between the observed and 
expected scores can be attributed to some actual difference in behavior or if this 
difference between the scores is a deviation from the norm profile caused by an attack. 
The following illustrates the X2 test: 
Consider there are P variables to measure and Xj denotes the observation of the jth 
variable at a particular time the X2 test statistic is given by the equation (4). 
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X2 is the sum of squared differences between the observed and expected values of those 
variables. When the P variables are independent and P is large, the X2 statistic follows 
approximately a normal distribution.  
The X2 distance test measures the distance of a data point from the center of a data 
population. Thus, it is similar to Euclidean distance [52] but uses the average value on 
each variable to scale the Euclidean distance on that variable or dimension. 
Unlike the Hotelling’s T2 statistic which is a distance measure taking into account the 
covariance of multiple variables, the X2 does not consider the relationships of multiple 
variables in order to simplify the computation. 
 
Related Work 
A technique based on X2 statistic was presented by [47] that builds a norm profile of an 
information system and detects a large departure from the norm profile as a likely 
intrusion.  
The results of that study show that the multivariate statistical technique based on the chi-
square test statistic achieves low false alarm rate with high detection rate. 
Although in this study the X2 was tested using a small set of testing data, the results of 
this study demonstrate the promising potential of this technique for intrusion detection. It 
was concluded that this technique will be tested in the future with a large set of testing 
data for further evaluating of the performance and scalability. 
c. Principal Components Analysis 
Principal components analysis (PCA) [51], [57], [58] is used to explain the variance-
covariance structure through few linear combinations of the original variables. PCA is 
also known as a projection method and its key objective is data reduction in a rich data 
environment for easy exploration and further analysis.  
Work in the areas of digital signal and image processing [57], [58] found that, depending 
on the nature of data, it can be adequately explained using just a few factors, often far 
fewer than the number of original variables. Moreover, there is almost as much 
information in the few principal components as there is in all of the original variables  
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Principal components are particular linear combinations of original variable set with three 
important properties [47]: 
1- The principal components are uncorrelated. 
2- The first principal component has the highest variance; the second principal has 
the second highest variance and so on. 
3- The total variation in all the principal components combined equal to the total 
variation in the original variables. 
The new variables with such properties are obtained from the eigenvalues’ analysis of 
the covariance matrix of the original variables [48]. 
Thus, the data overload often experienced in a rich data environment can be solved using 
PCA by observing the first few principal components with no significant loss of 
information. It is often found that PCA provides combinations of variables that are useful 
indicators of particular events or stages in the process. 
 
Related Work 
Cai [59] proposes the use of Principal component analysis in the detection of intrusions 
from malicious executables often spread as e-mail attachments. This technique 
outperforms many other techniques by detecting malicious executables identified as 
outliers that significantly deviate from the normal profile. 
Shyu [51] proposes a novel scheme that uses robust principal component classifier in 
intrusion detection problem where the training data may be unsupervised. As anomalies 
can be treated as outliers, an intrusion predictive model is constructed from the major and 
minor principal components of normal instances. Anomalies are qualitatively different 
from the normal instances. That is a large deviation from the established normal patterns 
can be flagged as attacks. So, a measure of the difference of an anomaly from the normal 
instance is the distance in the principal component space. 
This approach was tested on the KDD Cup 1999 [51]and it demonstrates that this method 
achieves high detection rate with low false alarm rate and outperforms other earlier 
techniques. Moreover, the statistics can be computed in less amount of time during the 
detection stage which makes it possible to use the method in real time. 
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Advantage of Principal component analysis to intrusion detection 
The principal component approach to intrusion detection has some advantages [51].  
First, it does not have any distributional assumption. Many statistical based intrusion 
detection methods assume a normal distribution which is a very general assumption and 
is not supported by any observation. 
Second, it is typical for the data of this type of problems to be of high dimensionality. 
Hence, principal component analysis (PCA) is applied to reduce the dimensionality of the 
original data without sacrificing valuable information. Only a few parameters of principal 
components need to be retained for future detection as well.     
3.3.3 Comparison between the different Statistical techniques 
Nong ye [46] compared the results of two multivariate statistical techniques such as 
Hotelling’s T2, and the Chi-square X2 test in order to analyze and detect intrusions into 
the host that leave trails in the audit data. As stated above, both Hotelling’s T2 test 
statistic and the Chi-square X2 test measure the distance of an observation from the 
multivariate mean vector of a population. The Hotelling’s T2 test statistic uses the 
statistical distance that incorporates both mean shifts and counter-relationships (the 
relationships of multiple variables) whereas the Chi-square X2 test detects only mean 
shifts. 
The results of this study show that the performance of Hotelling’s T2 test for intrusion 
detection is not compensated by its intensive computation in comparison to the 
performance of the Chi-square X2 test that detects only mean shifts. The Chi-square X2 
performed well in intrusion detection, it signaled all the intrusion session and produced 
no false alarms on the normal sessions. Therefore, it appears that a Chi-square X2 
multivariate analysis technique detecting mean shifts is only sufficient and effective for 
intrusion detection than The Hotelling’s T2 test.  This is due to the nature of intrusion 
detection problem which distinguishes between normal events from intrusive events by 
capturing any departure from the normal profile i.e. any deviation of an observation from 
the mean as an anomaly or likely intrusion. Thus, intrusion is manifested more through 
focusing on detecting mean shifts rather than the relationships of multiple variables. 
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Moreover, the computational complexity of the Chi-square X2 test is much less than the 
Hotelling’s T2 test. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on two important areas related to the work presented in the thesis. 
First, it reviews previous work in the area of detecting attacks through source codes 
analysis. Second, it describes statistical based anomaly detection technique such as 
Univariate and Multivariate statistical technique.  
It points how Multivariate technique provides an overall picture about the process change 
than Univariate technique which does not take into account that variables are dependent 
of each other. Thus, it fails in detection because abnormality information is concealed 
inside the relationship among the variables.  
Multivariate statistical techniques can be classified into distance-based techniques, and 
variance-covariance relation based techniques. 
Distance-based techniques use the distance between the mean normal profile and the 
current observation value in order to detect intrusions. There are many distance metrics 
that fall under this category such as the Euclidean distance, Chi-square, and Canberra 
metric [52]. 
Variance-covariance relation based techniques use a measure that takes into account the 
covariance of multiple variables (the relationship of multi-variables). Hotelling’s T2 and 
Principal Component Analysis fall under this category. However, Principal Component 
Analysis provides a greater advantage in comparison to Hotelling’s T2 because it reduces 
the data dimensionality without sacrificing information content. So, instead of dealing 
with hundreds of variables, a few principal components are used.  
Based on the above, the work on the thesis will focus on using Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) as a statistical technique to reduce data dimensionality of the variables 
(features) in VBScript codes. 
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Chapter 4: Development of an Anomaly Host Based IDS  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Rapid development in Internet technology provided people with a convenient way to 
exchange large amounts of information. However, the Internet is basically an insecure 
environment mainly because its native design lacks the presence of security barriers to 
prevent malicious attacks. For that reason, the need for Internet security systems grew as 
fast as the dependence on the Internet to conduct business transactions. 
 
Another area that received significant attention as well was the detection of attacks 
through the analysis of the source code of the incoming data streams. This technique is 
most useful in identifying attacks embedded in Shell and C source codes (in UNIX 
environment). 
 
The use of script languages, especially VBScripts [23], [44] on web pages is now a 
common practice. VBScript attacks continue to be a leading security threat on the 
Internet. A VBScript virus, such as “Loveletter” [40] caused global havoc by embedding 
its code in HTML email to hide its malicious potential. Moreover, VBScript is a very 
easy script language to program. Accordingly, writing a VBScript virus nowadays is 
becoming an extremely easy task in comparison to the old use of assemblers requiring 
specialized and highly skilled programmers. 
 
As a result of the above discussion, the work presented in this thesis addresses an area 
that received little attention despite its growing importance. This chapter will present an 
anomaly host based IDS that efficiently identifies VBScript attacks. As stated earlier in 
chapter 3, this IDS model represents an extension on a similar research line followed by 
Cunningham [19], which detects script codes of UNIX attacks developed in C or shell 
script code that increase privileges. The introduced technique uses a classifier based on a 
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Multivariate statistical technique, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [57], to identify 
patterns of benign behavior and to express the data in such a way to highlight their 
similarities and differences. So, the IDS could easily differentiate between normal and 
malicious VBScripts, and could capture any future malicious scripts that exhibit different 
or abnormal patterns from a profile of normal behavior.  
 
The analysis followed to develop the IDS was divided into the following phases: 
1. Malicious code study: this phase studies the behavior of malicious VBScript 
codes and how malicious patterns deviate from normal behavior. The outcome of 
this study was useful in identifying the key differences between patterns of benign 
and malicious scripts. 
2. Pattern Identification (feature extractor): in that stage, the concern was to identify 
patterns that characterize benign codes. Hence, a large data set was collected to 
extract features that identify the common themes across the code. This problem is 
tackled by using an efficient multivariate statistical technique such as PCA 
statistical analysis as a feature extractor. 
3. Attack Classifier: an implementation for an attack classifier was proposed. This 
classifier is used to learn the best combination of feature elements in order to 
categorize the incoming script into normal or malicious code. 
4. Results analysis and validation: this phase analyzes the results to show the 
validity of the hypotheses proposed.  
 
4.2 Malicious code study 
 
Script mobile codes are usually written in scrip ting language, such as VBScript or Java 
script. VBScript language was developed by Microsoft as a competitor to Java script for 
automating web pages; the most obvious difference between them is only in their syntax 
[10]. My preference to study and focus on VBScript is due to the fact that VBScript is 
receiving increasing focus as a serious threat for attacking many computers [10], [44]. To 
illustrate the size of the problem associated with the lack of security in mobile VBScript 
codes, it is remarkable to realize that in 1999; only 2 malicious VBScript were publicly 
 44 
known [10]. Nowadays there are more than 4000 registered malicious VBScript and the 
toll increases everyday [20], [21].  
This fact implies that VBScript codes are receiving increasing focus as a backdoor for 
attacking computers by threatening the user’s computer through sending itself through e-
mail attachment or through browsing an infected site. The core of the malicious script, 
which contains the destructive part of the virus, can restrict its activity to unnoticeable 
level by changing the windows registry, causing data’s loss, and spreading itself to infect 
other systems. 
4.2.1 Data Collection 
In order to study the behavior of malicious attacks, it was necessary to collect information 
around the nature of these attacks, the different methods of infections, and propagations. 
This necessitated getting hand on the source code of VBScript attacks in order to 
understand the specific behaviors exhibited by attack codes. 
The following represents various sources used in the process of gathering information 
around VBScript attacks, 
1. Antivirus sites (e.g. McAfee, Symantec) [20], [21]. 
Antivirus sites contain a wealth of information around the different viral attacks. 
They provide a comprehensive analysis on the behavior of the different attacks 
and its execution flow. 
2. Private security sites (e.g. Ebcvg.com Your source for information security)[60]. 
This was the main source used in gathering attack source codes. Over the internet, 
there are some sites specialized in serving information security. Many of these 
sites focus on building an up-to-date list of source codes of current attacks and 
they offer these sources for sale. 
3. Virus collectors’ sites (e.g. VX Heavens)[61]. 
Amateur sites were used to top up the gathered virus collection through 
exchanging Virii source codes with other collectors. 
 
Due to security measures over the Internet, getting a large sample of malicious VBScripts 
represents a difficult task because many hackers’ sites or virus collectors’ are rapidly 
closed. Moreover, displaying security vulnerabilities or holes on the Web could be used 
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as a conduit by other malicious hackers or rogue programs to steal data or wreak other 
damages. So, the total number of collected malicious VBScripts from private sites and 
virus collectors to represent the malicious VBScript code population in this work are in 
the range of 283 malicious VBScripts (see Appendix D).   
The group of malicious VBScripts under study covers many of the known attack 
techniques, 
1. Scripts that infect Vbs files and reside in the directories c:\, c:\windows, 
c:\windows\desktop, c:\my documents, and c:\startup. 
2. Sometimes these malignant scripts insert infected Vbs/doc/htm, or Vba macro 
virus. 
3. or propagate via MS-Outlook.  
 
On the other hand, in order to study the normal behavior of VBScript codes, 
approximately 1113 general-purpose VBScripts (see Appendix D) were collected 
representing around 3 times the attack code collection. This collection was gathered to 
cover a wide range of applications such as [44], 
1. Maintaining Disk and file systems, files and folders, logs, printing, processes, 
registry, and services. 
2. Providing security such as verifying script signature. 
3. Task scheduling. 
4. Creating users accounts and groups 
5. And other multi purpose script collected from Microsoft technet script  center.  
 
4.2.2 Attack pattern analysis 
The foundation of all attack detection techniques to date is based on the ability to 
differentiate between normal and malicious behaviors. This implicitly suggests that all 
malicious codes exhibit different behaviors in comparison to benign codes, at the same 
time codes within each group share common patterns (initially referred to as the 1st 
hypothesis stated earlier in Chapter1). 
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The first part of the above assumption was verified by analyzing the collected Malicious 
VBScript codes, as it was apparent that malicious script codes can take distinctive forms 
that differentiate them from normal codes. 
a. Types of attack codes 
According to the method of attack, malicious VBScript codes can be classified into 3 
main categories: namely viruses, worms, and Trojan horses [20], [21], [23]. 
1. A Virus is a program that causes an unexpected event by infecting and modifying 
other programs. It is also capable of self-execution and replication. 
2. A Worm is a program that resides in the active memory of a computer and 
duplicates itself. It may send copies to other computers through some 
communication applications (e.g. Internet Relay Chat - IRC). 
3. A Trojan Horse is a malicious program that pretends to be a benign application, 
but does unexpected destruction to different programs. Trojans are unlike viruses 
since they do not replicate.  
It is noted from the above classification that these categories of malicious codes are not 
mutually exclusive. For instance, a malicious program could be both a worm and a virus 
or a worm could be delivered as a Trojan. Hence, these forms of attacks cover all known 
malicious VBScripts. 
 
b. Life cycle of attack code 
In order to verify the 2nd part of the assumption (i.e., ‘attack codes share common 
patterns’), it is necessary to understand more about the life cycle of attack codes. The 
CERIAS Intrusion Detection Research Group [62] analyzed the behavior of several 
worms, and developed a general life-cycle that describes the different stages that an 
attack code passes through. The life cycle from the point of view of the victim host 
consists of four stages as shown in Figure 4. 1: 
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Figure 4. 1 : The Life Cycle of Attack Codes. 
 
 
1. Target selection 
The target selection stage is the phase when an uninfected host is chosen 
for attack. This is where the malicious code or worm performs 
reconnaissance to determine other potential victims. 
 
 
2. Exploitation 
The exploitation phase is when the attacker compromises the target by 
exploiting a particular vulnerability (or convincing the victim to execute 
the code). Worms use well known vulnerabilities and published exploits to 
compromise their target. 
 
3. Infection 
The infection stage is significant in this life-cycle, as the malicious code 
copies itself on to the victim machine and then performs any number of 
different actions. The line between the infection and exploitation stage is 
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sometimes blurred. For example, the Code Red worm13 [62]actually loads 
itself into the victim’s memory as part of the exploit used to compromise 
the victim. The infection stage is understood to be the time when the worm 
“sets up shop” on the newly infected machine. For example, the worm can 
open backdoors, change system files, or attempt to hide its presence by 
replacing system utilities with Trojan horses. 
 
4. Propagation 
In the propagation stage, the malicious code attempts to spread by 
choosing new targets. The difference between this stage and the target 
selection is simply from the point of view of the machine which the 
actions take place from. In target selection, a remotely infected host 
chooses the local host as a target. In the propagation stage, the infected 
local host is the one choosing a new target, using probes going out in 
outbound network traffic. 
According to the aforementioned categorization, it is clear that the typical malicious 
script codes can exhibit many similar activities [20], [21]. By grouping their common 
actions, it can be concluded that malicious VBScript can perform one or more of the 
following basic functions: 
· Registration, allows the malicious code, to register itself on infected machines for 
future reference. Discovering the attack code during this stage is quite difficult, as 
the malicious code would restrict its activity to an unnoticeable level. 
· Infection, is the core of the malicious code, and contains the destructive part of 
the virus. Typically, this includes effects such as loss of data or sluggish system 
response. 
· Replication is the method where a malicious code can survive by infecting new 
systems. 
 
                                                 
13  It is a computer Worm, discovered in July 2001. It only infects windows machines running Microsoft IIS 
web servers. It exploits a bufferoverrun vulnerability which was by no means new when the worm started to 
spread. 
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According to the above discussion, malicious VBScript can be detected by extracting 
abnormal ‘features’ from malicious codes that deviate from normal behavior.  
c. ‘Features’ of attack codes 
In order to be able to group the different behavioral patterns of normal or attack codes, it 
is necessary to introduce a definition of the features that can be used to identify such 
patterns. 
A feature can be defined as a particular regular expression or element that is scanned 
over a particular code. Each time the regular expression matches, the feature type 
statistics is set by applying different encoding schemes. 
Accordingly, a feature type can be thought of as a set of: 
a. Regular expression or element: which is a fragment or constituent of a larger unit 
(script code), it is composed of VBScript lexically related keywords, function, or 
methods that are combined together to form a specific pattern or feature. 
b. Encoding schemes: are the statistics used to record a match found of a regular 
expression within the code. There are several encoding schemes used in the 
current problem such as:  
Repetition (count): it indicates the total number of times an element appears in 
normal or malicious codes 
Occurrence: it indicates the existence of an element within the code. 
 
In order to illustrate this concept, the following example shows a typical malicious 
feature that uses MS Outlook to mass-mail other hosts. The worm uses distinct keywords 
to propagate via MS Outlook (its basic function is replication as stated above)[21]: 
1. First step, it creates an object to enable using MS Outlook. In VBS this is done by 
calling the ‘CreateObject’ method and putting ‘Outlook.Application’ as a 
parameter. Hence the lexical word used to identify that segment of the feature is 
· "Createobject(Outlook.Application) 
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2. After creating an object equivalent to MS Outlook application, it is necessary to 
gain access to the mail system in order to be able to send emails. This is carried 
by getting the namespace for the Mail Application Programming Interface 
(MAPI). That step is typically carried using the following command 
· "Getnamespace(“MAPI”) 
 
3. After opening MS Outlook and getting access to the mail system, the next step is 
to get the address list from the current user on the victim machine. This step 
usually involves recalls to the following properties 
· "Addresslists" 
· "Addressentries.count" 
 
 
4. The final step in the replication feature is to create a mail message and send it to 
the identified address list. The mail has a subject line, body, and attached 
document, hence that segment of the replication feature would typically use 
any/all of the following properties 
· "CreateItem" 
· "Subject" 
· "Body" 
· "Attachment" 
· "Send" 
 
 
4.3 Pattern Identification (feature extractor) 
4.3.1 Application of Principal Component Analysis to the feature 
extraction problem 
VBScript language is quite a simple language  for programming. Yet despite its 
simplicity, the ability to get relations that combine a group of VBScript features can be 
computationally intensive. The regular expressions used in the current problem are so 
large and lies in the range of 243 elements of VBScript lexically related keywords, 
 51 
functions, properties, or methods [44]. Accordingly, relations between patterns are hard 
to find in data of high dimensions. The larger the elements that constitute the data, the 
more difficult is identifying patterns by highlighting their similarities and differences.  
As outlined earlier, there are several statistical multivariate techniques that are used to 
deduce the relations among a data set. In particular, PCA (see Appendix C) is used to 
reduce the dimensionality of data in which a large number of variables are interrelated. 
PCA accomplishes this by computing a smaller set of uncorrelated variables which best 
represent the original data. In this case, the use of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
[57], [58] can greatly help in reducing the dimensionality of the problem while keeping 
the significant “principal components” in the reduced data set. It is therefore desirable to 
extract measurements that are invariant or insensitive to the variations within each class. 
The process of extracting such measurements is labeled hereafter as “feature extraction”. 
Thus, PCA is used as a feature extractor to extract patterns that will be used by the 
classifier, which follows the feature extractor, to differentiate between normal and 
malicious script.  
4.3.2 Definition of Principal Component Analysis  
As explained in chapter 3, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [58] represents a 
classical statistical technique that is used to analyze the covariance structure of 
Multivariate statistical observations. The idea behind PCA is quite old. It roots back to 
Pearson [57] in 1901 as a methodology for fitting planes in the least-squares sense (like in 
linear regression). It was Hotelling (1933) [57] who proposed this technique for the 
purpose of analyzing the correlation structure between many random variables. 
The purpose of PCA is to identify the dependence structure behind a Multivariate 
stochastic observation in order to obtain a compact description of it. So, PCA replaces the 
original highly correlated variables of a data set with a smaller number of less correlated 
variables called the principal components. These principal components are the key 
features of the random observation vector and in the IDS context can be used to 
differentiate between benign and malicious script [57], [58].  
If the original data set of dimension n contains highly correlated variables, then PCA 
maps the data into a different space where each element represent a dimension of that 
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space, and by observing the relative sizes of the  mapped-out data, only the higher 
(principal) m components of the data are selected that describes most of the data. The 
presence of fewer components (m) makes it easier to label each dimension with an 
intuitive meaning. The n observed variables are thus represented as functions of m latent 
variables called factors, where m < n (and often m << n). Thus, such analysis has a great 
advantage of reducing the data dimensionality that might in many cases be of exponential 
order while maintaining the information content [57].  
In a statistical context the number n is called the superficial dimensionality of the data, 
where m is called the intrinsic dimensionality of the data. The stronger the correlation 
between the observed variables is, the smaller the number of independent variables (m) 
that can adequately describe them [57].  
4.3.3 Steps to perform PCA in feature extraction 
As illustrated above, PCA [57] is a powerful tool for analyzing data; it is used to find 
patterns in data of high dimensions by reducing the number of dimensions without loss of 
information. The following represents the steps used by PCA to reduce the VBScript 
elements’ dimensionality by identifying the correlation between them [58].  
a. Data normalization. 
b. Calculation of the covariance matrix and correlation matrix. 
c. Calculation of the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the covariance matrix. 
d. Choosing the principal components. 
 
A parser (feature extractor) was developed (using the C language) to extract the existence 
and occurrence of VBScript elements (attributes of a specific feature) in a code 
population in Appendix A. This operation is applied on multiple files (benign and 
malicious files) to develop the occurrence matrix of VBScript elements (regular 
expression). The parser does the following functions to help analyze and understand how 
relevant each feature under test is: 
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a. Data Normalization 
Following Cunningham’s approach [19], the problem of identifying features of common 
benign code was translated to testing the occurrence and repetition (stated above) of 
VBScript elements (regular expression) on the benign data set used for training the 
extractor. 
Collection of statistics around regular expression (VBScript elements): 
As stated above, the parser collects statistics (occurrence and repetition) around 
VBScript elements’ within the code population under test. A file that contains all 
the VBScript elements is scanned over malicious and benign scripts. Each time 
the regular expression (VBScript elements) finds a match within the code, this 
match is recorded.  
Mean and Variance calculation: 
The feature extractor was designed to compute the mean14 (in Appendix B) of the 
occurrence of VBScript elements for malicious and benign script.  
The calculation of the mean value (the average). 
å
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Where m indicates the mean of the set X in (5). 
 
It also computes the variance15 (in Appendix B) in order to show the spread of 
data from the mean. Then, the parser runs over both malicious and benign code 
                                                 
14 The mean of a collection of numbers is their arithmetic average, computed by adding them up and 
dividing by their number. 
 
15 A measure of the average distance between each of a set of data points and their mean value; equal to the 
sum of the squares of the deviation from the mean value. 
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population to compute the Total Variance (TV), Variance for Clean (VC), and 
Variance for Malicious (VM).  
· Total Variance (TV): is the computation of the variance for the code 
population that constitutes both normal and malicious scripts. 
· Variance for Clean (VC): it is the calculation of the variance for normal 
scripts code population. 
· Variance for Malicious (VM): it is the calculation of the variance for 
malicious scripts code population. 
The Total Variance Ratio (R) is computed as in the following equation (8), where the 
objective is Total Variance Ratio (R) maximization. This could be achieved by dividing 
the Total Variance (TV) by the Variance for clean (VC) multiplied by Weight116 and 
Variance for malicious (VM) multiplied by Weight217. Thus, the Total Variance (R) is 
maximized for both Normal and Malicious codes.  
The Total Variance Ratio (R) = (Weight1 * (TV/ VC) + Weight2 * (TV/VM)). (8) 
 
 
 
 Vc 
Elements 
Vm 
 
Figure 4. 2 : Elements of Primary filter 
 
                                                 
16 Weight1is the total number of normal scripts divided by total number of normal and malicious scripts’ files. 
 
17 Weight2 is the total number of malicious scripts divided by total number of normal and malicious scripts’ files. 
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The Variance for clean (VC), and the Variance for Malicious (VM) in the above  Figure 
4. 2 could be used as a Primary filter to differentiate between benign and malicious 
scripts. 
 If Variance for clean (VC) of some VBScript elements records high value in clean 
scripts, while it records zero value in malicious scripts, or vice versa; thus, these 
VBScript elements are retained to be used as primary filter to differentiate between 
normal and malicious scripts. 
 R 
Elements 
P: Selection threshold 
 
Figure 4. 3 : Elements sorted according to their highest Total Variance Ratio (R) 
 
After selecting the elements that will constitute the primary filter, the rest of VBScript 
elements are sorted in descending order according to their Total Variance Ratio (R). A 
threshold is set to select a number of elements P that have the highest Total Variance 
Ratio (R), and discard those with lowest values. Thus, the elements’ size is reduced, 
while retaining the most information see Figure 4. 3.  
The following step illustrates the calculation of the covariance matrix P × P on these 
reduced or selected number of VBScript elements P.  
b. The Computation of the Covariance Matrix or the Correlation 
matrix: 
The rotation of the existing axis is computed by getting the Covariance between the 
selected P elements. Thus, the covariance matrix (see Appendix B) is a square matrix of 
dimension equal to P. 
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The covariance Matrix or a correlation matrix18 is always measured between 2 
dimensions as described in the following equation (6): 
( ) Tk
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k
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=
.   (6) 
Where X  and Y  are the mean of the set X and Y. 
 
The correlation between a pair of variables is equivalent to the covariance divided by the 
product of the standard deviations of the two variables X and Y, as described in the 
following formula (7): 
Correlation matrix = 
YX
YXCOV
¶¶
),(
.    (7) 
The correlation between the elements in the correlation matrix can be categorized as 
follows: 
 
· Low correlation: the correlation between the elements is less than 30%. 
· Medium correlation: the correlation between the elements is in the band 30-70%. 
· And high correlation: the correlation between the elements is higher than 70%. 
 
Thus, if two elements are highly correlated (correlation between the elements higher than 
70%) in the correlation matrix; so, one element of them is selected, the one with the 
highest Total Variance Ratio (R) in the computation of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors. 
If there is no correlation between the elements or the correlation is low, all the elements 
are taken into account to perform the computation of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors. 
c. Computation of the Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors of the 
Covariance matrix: 
In this step, Eigen-decomposition is calculated by finding the roots eigenvalues and their 
corresponding eigenvectors19 (in Appendix B). Matlab is used to perform this 
                                                 
18 The results of Correlation Matrix are the same as the Variance-Covariance Matrix because the correlation between a 
pair of variables is equivalent to the covariance divided by the product of the standard deviations of both variables. 
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computation of eigenvalues and eigenvectors. In general, once eigenvectors are computed 
from the covariance matrix, then they are sorted according to their highest eigenvalues in 
order to give the elements that constitute the components an order of significance. So, the 
decision can easily be made at this stage to ignore the components of lesser significance 
while keeping those of higher significance. The higher the eigenvalues, the more 
characteristic features of a script does the particular eigenvector describe [58], [64].  
d. Choosing the principal components 
The eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue is the principal component of the data set 
that points down the middle of the data. Elements with low eigenvalues can be omitted as 
they only describe a small part of the characteristic features of the script. 
A feature vector (eigenfeatures) is formed by setting a threshold to select a number of 
elements (M’) from the list of eigenvectors that have the highest eigenvalues. Thus, the 
elements’ size is reduced and these elements, which are easily used as the main principal 
components, constitute the secondary filter to differentiate between normal and malicious 
script.  
 
4.4 Attack Classifier 
 
Once the feature vector (The M’ significant eigenvectors of the covariance matrix P × P 
are chosen as those with the largest associated eigenvalues) is created, identification 
becomes a pattern recognition task.  
Those eigenfeatures or (eigen VBScript elements) span an M’ dimensional subspace of 
the original N  VBScript elements space. This eigenfeature vector M’ is used to find 
which of the two pre-defined classes (Normal or Malicious script) best describes the 
script.  
The simplest method for determining which class provides the best description of an 
input script is to find the Euclidean distance [64] from the centre of both clean and 
malicious codes. 
                                                                                                                                        
19 Eigenvector is a vector which, when acted on by a particular linear transformation, produces a scalar multiple 
of the original vector. The scalar in question is called the eigenvalue corresponding to this eigenvector. 
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Where in (9) nja is the mean (center) of each class Normal or Malicious script, and ija  
represents the script under test. 
 
 
Center of Clean script 
Script under test 
Distance to clean 
Distance to Malicious 
 
Figure 4. 4 : The Computation of the Euclidean Distance from the center of both clean and malicious 
codes. 
Euclidean Distance [52], [64] as in Figure 4. 4 is a straight line distance used as a 
measure of similarity in the nearest neighbor method. Classification based on this 
distance measure is direct and simple where the mean values of the elements in malicious 
or normal script are used as class centers. A script is classified as belonging to malicious 
class, if the Distance to Malicious center is less than the Distance to Normal center. 
Otherwise, it belongs to normal class. This means that when the minimum Euclidean 
Distance niD  is below some chosen threshold (h) from the center of benign data 
population, a script can be categorized as benign script. 
In testing the classifier, if a test sample is benign yet the measured Euclidean distance is 
higher than the threshold, the case represents a false positive case. On the other hand if 
the test sample is for a malicious script, and the measured distance is less than the 
threshold, the case represents a false negative [8]. 
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It is clear from the above that the selection of that threshold has a key impact on the 
accuracy of the classifier. Selecting a large threshold would lead to the generation of a 
high false negative rate (missing detection), yet selecting a tight threshold would lead to 
the generation of a high false positive rate (wrong detection). 
4.5 Results Analysis & Validation 
 
As stated earlier, the 2 main objectives of the work are: 
· To isolate features common to the malicious attacks, and 
· To propose an implementation for an attack classifier that would allow for using these 
features in order to efficiently detect VBScript malicious attack. 
4.5.1 Efficiency and performance measures 
First in doing so, there is a need of setting measurements to quantify the system’s 
efficiency. The following are measurements used in our experiments [8]: 
1. There are four measures used, such as true positives, true negatives, false positives, 
and false negatives. 
· A true positive is a malicious example that is correctly tagged as malicious. 
· A true negative is a benign example that is correctly classified as benign. 
· A false positive is a benign program that has been mislabeled by an algorithm as 
malicious. 
· While, a false negative is a malicious executable that has been misclassified as a 
benign program. 
2. The detection rate is the number of malicious binaries correctly classified divided by 
the total number of malicious programs tested. 
For the ‘feature’, efficiency would be defined through the relation between the 
percentage of feature hit to the population code (normal and malicious code), in other 
words “how many abnormal feature elements are present in how much of the code 
population”. According to that measure an efficient feature (a good representative of 
malicious feature) will score high when applied over the malicious code population (and 
alternatively will score low when applied over the normal code population). This 
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efficiency measure will support demonstrating the validity of the 1st hypothesis. The 
parsing system stated earlier allows for testing the efficiency of the isolated features.  
For the ‘attack classifier’, efficiency would be defined as establishing a high rate of 
attack detection with a low rate of false positive alarms. This measure will support 
demonstrating the 2nd hypothesis. It will be depicted using ROC curves (Receiver 
Operating Characteristic) [27], which are widely used to measure the effectiveness of an 
intrusion detection system by plotting the likelihood that an intrusion is correctly detected 
against the likelihood that a non- intrusion is misclassified (false positives). This will 
allow for judging on the effectiveness of the system. 
Both efficiency measures allow for validating the assumptions (hypotheses) upon which 
the work is built. 
4.5.2 Experiments for training and testing 
Two types of experiments will be used to train and test the system: 
1. Experiment over unseen VBScript: where a cross validation20 [35] is used to 
experiment the proposed system in estimating the results of detecting new 
malicious VBScripts. K fold cross validation [35] is the standard method to 
estimate the performance of predictions over unseen data, which means that the 
data is divided into k subsets of approximately equal size. The system will be 
trained k times, each time leaving out one of the subsets from training, but using 
only the omitted set to compute whatever criterion. 
The system will use five fold cross validation, where the population code (normal 
and malicious scripts) will be partitioned into five equal size sets. Four of these 
sets will be used for training the system and then the remaining set will be used 
for evaluation. This process will be repeated five times by leaving out a different 
set for testing every time. The results of these tests will be averaged to obtain a 
measure of how the system performs in detecting new malicious VBScript. This 
                                                 
20 Cross validation is a method aiming at estimating the error of a hypothesis, generated by a concept learning 
algorithm (classifier).  
 
 61 
method is envisaged to give a reliable measure of the new system’s accuracy on 
unseen data. 
2. Experiment over known VBScript: this experiment will evaluate the performance 
of the system on detecting known VBScripts. For this task, the system will 
generate detection for the entire training set of data (normal and malicious code 
population). This means that the same data set will be used for training and for 
testing the system.  
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The work introduced in this chapter is an extension on a similar research line followed by 
Cunningham [19]. The proposed system is an anomaly host based IDS that provides 
protection against web attacks from malicious VBScripts.  
It is based on two important hypotheses: the 1st hypothesis is that the majority of 
malicious codes exhibit different behaviors in comparison to normal codes, at the same 
time whether the codes within each group share common patterns. While the 2nd 
hypothesis assumes that the code patterns exhibited in malicious VBScripts are unique to 
attack codes and record very low presence in normal VBScripts. 
To prove the validity of the hypotheses proposed, a large data set was collected for both 
normal and malicious scripts in order to study the nature of normal VBScrip ts and detect 
how malicious script deviates from the normal profile. 
Moreover, the proposed technique comprises two significant components: a feature 
extractor (pattern identification) and an attack classifier. 
The proposed feature extractor is based on a Multivariate Statistical technique, Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) [57] that extracts common patterns to distinguish between 
normal and malicious script. PCA analysis is carried on the proposed problem to reduce 
the dimensionality of the problem while keeping the significant “principal components” 
in the reduced data set. Thus, PCA highlights the key differences between patterns of 
benign and malicious scripts. 
An attack classifier, which follows the feature extractor, uses the Euclidean distance [64] 
to learn the best combination of feature elements in order to categorize the incoming 
script into normal or malicious code. 
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The following chapter presents an analysis of the results of the proposed system in order 
to demonstrate the validity of the hypotheses proposed. 
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Chapter 5: Results Analysis and Validation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As outlined in chapter 4, the development of IDS passed by three main stages: malicious 
code study, pattern identification and development of the attack classifier. This chapter 
will go through the detailed steps taken in order to generate the results in each stage of 
the IDS development and analyze them. A key outcome as well is to verify the initial 
assumptions (hypothesis) on which the work is built. Finally, the methodology used in 
testing with the results will be presented and discussed. 
5.2 Input Data Analysis 
 
To test the proposed system, the first stage of the work focused on building a collection 
of both normal (non-malicious) and malicious codes. Malicious script source codes (as 
stated in the previous chapter) were gathered from various sources, and it was possible to 
collect a population of VBS attacks representing exactly 283  malicious VBScript attacks 
(see Appendix D) known (on McAfee and Symantec databases). 
The study of the malicious code revealed that the attack source codes usually perform one 
of the following actions: 
· Access the registry 
· Access the user’s mailing list 
· Launch tasks 
· Create users and groups 
· Change user’s permissions 
· Change and create files 
· Change the directory structure 
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It was thus essential to build the benign code population that covers both complete 
applications as well as short task-specific scripts. The collected population of benign 
scripts is in the actual of 1113 normal scripts in Appendix D, as described in Table 5. 1 
below  
In general, the benign data set was collected to maintain the diversity of the following 
source code properties such as: 
· Nature of task performed: the benign scripts were collected to cover a wide range 
of application including the actions that were identified earlier during the study of 
the malicious code.  
· Source: the benign data was collected from a variety of sources in order to make 
sure that it covers a wide range of programming styles. 
 
Table 5. 1: The population of collected benign and malicious scripts 
 Malicious Benign 
Script files 283 1113 
 
The feature elements of the VBScript language are the various VBScript related 
keywords such as methods, properties, and functions available in the language. They are 
exactly 243 elements in total. The following Table 5. 2 shows the feature elements of 
VBScript used in the analysis [69], [70]. 
 
Table 5. 2: Total VBScript elements or VBScript  lexically related keywords used in the feature 
list [69], [70]. 
Abs( IsArray( StrReverse( RegRead( Named .Environment( 
Array( IsDate( Tan( RegWrite( Number .Error 
Asc( IsEmpty( Time Remove( Path .ExitCode 
Atn( IsNull( Timer RemoveNetworkDrive( ProcessID .FullName 
CBool( IsNumeric( TimeSerial( 
RemovePrinterConnect
ion( RelativePath .Hotkey = 
CByte( IsObject( TimeValue( Run( ScriptFullName .IconLocation = 
CCur( Join( TypeName( Save ScriptName .Interactive 
CDate( LBound( UBound( SendKeys( Source .Item( 
CDbl( LCase( UCase( SetDefaultPrinter( SourceText .length 
Chr( Left( Unescape( ShowUsage SpecialFolders( .Line 
CInt( Len( VarType( Sign ( Status .Name 
CLng( LoadPicture( Weekday( SignFile ( StdErr .Named 
Cos( Log( WeekdayName( Skip( StdIn .Number 
CreateObject( LTrim( Year( SkipLine StdOut .Path 
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CSng( RTrim( 
AddPrinterConn
ection( Sleep( TargetPath .ProcessID 
CStr( Trim( 
AddWindowsPri
nterConnection( Terminate Unnamed .RelativePath 
Date Mid( AppActivate Verify ( UserDomain .ScriptFullName 
DateAdd( Minute( Close VerifyFile ( UserName .ScriptName 
DateDiff( Month( ConnectObject( Write( Version .Source 
DatePart( MonthName( Count WriteBlankLines( WindowStyle .SourceText 
DateSerial( MsgBox( CreateObject( WriteLine( WorkingDirectory .SpecialFolders( 
DateValue( Now CreateScript( Arguments 
HKEY_CURRENT
_USER .Status 
Day( Oct( CreateShortcut( AtEndOfLine HKCU .StdErr 
Escape( Replace( 
DisconnectObjec
t ( AtEndOfStream 
HKEY_LOCAL_M
ACHINE .StdIn 
Eval( RGB( echo BuildVersion HKLM .StdOut 
Exp( Right( 
EnumNetworkDr
ives Character 
HKEY_CLASSES_
ROOT  .TargetPath 
Filter( Rnd( 
EnumPrinterCon
nections Column HKCR .Unnamed 
FormatCurrency( Round( Exec( ComputerName HKEY_USERS .UserDomain  
FormatDateTime( ScriptEngine Execute CurrentDirectory 
HKEY_CURRENT
_CONFIG .UserName 
FormatNumber( 
ScriptEngineBuildV
ersion Exists( Description WScript .Version 
FormatPercent( 
ScriptEngineMajor
Version 
ExpandEnviron
mentStrings( Environment( 
("WScript.Network"
) .WindowStyle 
GetLocale( 
ScriptEngineMinor
Version GetObject( Error ("WScript.Shell") .WorkingDirectory 
GetObject( Second( getResource( ExitCode .Arguments 
.PrivateProfileString
( 
GetRef( SetLocale( LogEvent( FullName .AtEndOfLine .ProfileString( 
Hex( Sgn( 
MapNetworkDri
ve( Hotkey .AtEndOfStream Clear 
Hour( Sin( Popup( IconLocation .BuildVersion Raise 
InputBox( Space( Quit( Interactive .Character replace 
InStr( Split( Read( Item( .Column Test( 
InStrRev( Sqr( ReadAll length .ComputerName  
Int( StrComp( ReadLine Line .CurrentDirectory  
Fix( String( RegDelete    ( Name .Description  
 
5.3 Parser design and operation 
 
In order to be able to test the presence of specific features in the code, it was essential to 
develop a tool that would help extracting the features from the benign data set described 
above. A program was developed (hereafter called ‘the parser’) see Appendix A. A parser 
was developed in C language due to its flexibility in file manipulation; it performs the 
following tasks: 
1. Reading a parameter file that includes the features whose presence is required to 
be tested, as well as the location of the source codes. 
2. Looping over the source codes and tests the occurrence of each of the elements in 
the features’ list. 
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3. Building a matrix containing the repetition of each element in the features’ list 
(the rows represent the source codes and the columns represent the features’ 
elements). 
4. Building another matrix containing the occurrence (if the repetition is higher than 
one, the occurrence flag is set to one, otherwise it is set to zero). 
5. Performing correlation analysis between the elements. 
6. Writing the results of the analysis onto an output file showing the parsing as well 
as the statistical analysis. 
5.4 Multivariate Statistical Analysis: PCA 
5.4.1 Data Normalization 
The feature extractor (parser) was designed to compute the mean of the occurrence of 
VBScript elements for malicious and benign script. It also computes the variance in order 
to show the spread of the data from the mean. The Variance for clean (VC), the Variance 
for Malicious (VM), and the total variance Ratio (R) were computed for clean and 
malicious scripts (combined code population). 
After applying the Parser on the benign data set using the feature elements outlined 
above, the next step is to narrow down the features selection from the current set of 243 
elements to a reduced and more descriptive set of feature elements that best describe the 
benign behavior. 
This is done over a series of steps that filters the number of elements in order to reach a 
reduced set of high significance (principal components). These steps are, 
a. Elimination of low usage elements: By computing the total variance Ratio R (over 
the combined code population). The elements corresponding to low R values 
represent elements which are rarely used see Table 5. 3 In the following analysis, 
the cutoff is taken as R = 0. 
Table 5. 3: Low Usage Elements  
Atn(   oct(   createscript(  skip(  
Ccur(   scriptenginebuildversion   disconnectobject(  .currentdirectory  
Dateadd(  setlocale(  enumprinterconnections   .exitcode  
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datepart(  tan(   getresource(  .hotkey =  
dateserial(  timeserial(  logevent(  .relativepath  
formatcurrency(  weekday(   mapnetworkdrive(  .sourcetext  
formatdatetime(  weekdayname(  removenetworkdrive(  .stderr   
formatpercent(  addprinterconnection(  removeprinterconnection(  .profilestring(  
getref(   addwindowsprinterconnection(  sendkeys(   
Rtrim(  connectobject(  signfile (   
 
This step managed to reduce 18% (43 elements) of the initial elements set. The 
eliminated elements include for example mathematical functions (e.g. Atn, Tan, 
..) which are not commonly used in VBScript (being a non-technical script 
language). It also contains string manipulation elements (e.g. formatpercent, ..) 
which are usually handled by the html page. 
 
Two cascaded filters such as primary and secondary filters are used by the attack 
classifier as described below: 
 
b. Primary filter: 
1. Selection of elements with high VC : After computing the variance over the 
clean code set, the elements that score high over the benign code while 
maintaining a low variance over the malicious code, is selected as the first set of 
elements to be used in the classifier. In the following analysis, elements with VM 
= 0 with high VC are selected.  
In this step approximately (22 %) 53 of VBScript elements are retained to be used 
in the primary filter to differentiate between normal and malicious scripts 
illustrate in Table 5. 4 below. 
Table 5. 4: Elements used in the primary filter to detect normal scripts. 
array(   .scriptname  cdbl(   .unnamed  
quit(  lbound(  getlocale(   cos(  
.version   year(   regdelete(  csng(   
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isnull(   .column   fix(   eval(   
showusage  .userdomain  strcomp(   loadpicture(  
cbool(  isdate(   sleep(  monthname(  
.stdout   typename(  test( sgn(   
log(  terminate  formatnumber(   skipline   
isempty(  .interactive   scriptengineminorversion  .atendofline   
verify (  datevalue(   sqr(   .buildversion  
cint(  filter(  vartype(  .character  
isobject(  timevalue(   setdefaultprinter(   
remove(  .processid  verifyfile (   
.error  raise   .stdin    
 
2. Selection of elements with high VM: elements that have high variance over 
malicious code set and low variance over clean code set. It can be used as a 
source of differentiation in the primary filter by reciprocating its presence, i.e. 
by detecting its ‘absence’. This process led to the selection of 5 elements. 
  
Table 5. 5: Elements used in the primary filter to detect malicious scripts. 
.privateprofilestring(  appactivate  regwrite(  regedit(  
Cbyte(    
    
After selecting the elements that will constitute the primary filter, the rest of VBScript 
elements are sorted in descending order according to their Total Variance Ratio (R) as 
shown in the following Figure 5. 1. 
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Total Variance Ratio(R) soreted in descending order
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Figure 5. 1 : Total Variance Ratio(R) 
 
c. The R factor test 
In this step, a threshold is set to select a number of elements P that have the highest 
Total Variance Ratio (R), and discard those with lowest values. Thus, 20 % of the 
elements that have the highest Total Variance Ratio (R) are selected, so the 
elements’ size is reduced while retaining the most information as illustrated in 
Figure 5. 2, and Table 5. 6. 
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Total Variance Ratio (R)
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Figure 5. 2 : The R factor test. 
 
Table 5. 6: The selection of 20% (a cutoff threshold) of the elements that have the highest Total 
Variance Ratio (R). 
.number .scriptfullname .arguments write( 
cstr( writeline( .specialfolders( replace( 
array( scriptengine readall wscript 
hkey_users hkey_current_user clng( ltrim( 
Second( hex( rgb( hkey_local_machine 
hkey_classes_root echo asc( writeblanklines( 
.description rnd( getobject(  
 
The above group of keywords was found to strongly correlate in VBScript attacks. By 
analyzing these keywords, two distinct subcategories can be identified: 
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Registry related keywords (hkey_users, hkey_classes_root, hkey_current_user, 
hkey_local_machine ), and these are mostly used in attacks in order to register the 
virus on the infected machine, which is generally done by installing a registry key. 
 
File structure related keywords (.specialfolders(), write(), writeline(), replace(), 
writeblanklines( ), readall), and these are VBScript keywords which are used to alter 
the file structure. 
It is worth noting that the presence of any of the above elements, individually, does not 
provide enough evidence for suspecting an attack, yet it is the combination of all/most of 
the above at the measured correlation factors which provides such evidence. 
5.4.2 The Computation of the Covariance Matrix (or the Correlation 
matrix) 
As stated in the previous chapter, the rotation of the existing axis is computed by getting 
the Covariance between the selected P elements (reduced VBScript elements). Therefore, 
the covariance matrix is a square matrix (symmetric matrix) of dimension equal to P; the 
number of selected elements is P = 27, the covariance matrix will be 27 × 27.  
The following Figure 5. 3, Figure 5. 4, Figure 5. 5 represent a color map of the calculated 
covariance matrix P × P over malicious, normal, and combined (both normal and 
malicious) scripts.  
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M
alicious
.num
ber 
cstr(  array( hkey_users   
second(  
hkey_classes_root  
.description  
.scriptfullnam
e 
w
riteline( 
scriptengine 
hkey_current_user  
hex( echo rnd(  .argum
ents 
.specialfolders( 
readall  
clng(  rgb(  asc( 
getobject(  
w
rite( replace( 
w
script 
ltrim
( hkey_local_m
achine  
w
riteblanklines( 
.num
ber 
0
0.01
0.02
0.11
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.06
0.03
0.07
0.01
0.07
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.18
0.02
0.01
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.15
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
cstr(  
0.01
0
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0
0.07
0.03
0.01
0.13
0
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.01
0
0.17
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.09
0
0.03
0.01
array( 
0.02
0.01
0
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.01
0
0.07
0.03
0.07
0.01
0.07
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.02
0.37
0.05
0.17
0.03
0.07
0.05
0.01
0.09
0.03
hkey_users   
0.11
0.01
0.03
0
0.02
0.12
0.01
0
0.08
0.03
0.3
0.01
0.07
0.1
0.02
0.04
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.06
0.02
0.06
0.02
0.07
0.01
0.17
0.03
second(  
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0
0.21
0.01
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.27
0.01
0.06
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
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0.01
0.04
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0.06
0.05
0.01
0.01
0
0.02
hkey_classes_root  
0.04
0.02
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0.12
0.21
0
0.02
0.11
0
0.13
0.16
0.02
0.08
0.04
0.18
0.05
0.22
0.03
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0.04
0.09
0.05
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0.16
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0.05
.description  
0.01
0
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0
0.07
0.03
0.01
0.13
0
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.01
0
0.02
0.5
0.03
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0.04
0
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0.01
.scriptfullnam
e 0.02
0.07
0
0
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0.11
0.07
0
0.08
0.11
0.01
0.05
0.04
0.09
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0.14
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0.32
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scriptengine 
0.03
0.01
0.03
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0.11
0.08
0
0.04
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0.18
0.07
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0
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hkey_current_user  
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0.13
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0.3
0.27
0.16
0.13
0.01
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0.04
0
0.03
0.04
0.17
0.06
0.09
0.17
0.23
0.03
0.09
0.11
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0.15
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0.17
hex( 
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echo 
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0.22
rnd(  
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.argum
ents 
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.18
0.01
0.12
0.06
0.02
0.06
0.01
0.15
0.02
0
0.03
0.16
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.02
0
0.05
0.08
0.01
0.08
0.02
.specialfolders( 0.03
0.01
0.03
0.04
0.02
0.05
0.01
0.14
0.04
0.03
0.09
0.01
0.1
0.03
0.03
0
0.17
0.02
0.01
0.07
0.02
0.1
0.08
0.13
0.01
0.05
0.03
readall  
0.18
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.02
0.22
0.05
0.29
0.04
0.06
0.17
0.07
0.04
0.14
0.16
0.17
0
0.12
0.05
0.17
0.02
0.08
0.13
0.37
0.07
0.18
0.09
clng(  
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.09
0.05
0.02
0.23
0.01
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.12
0
0.01
0.04
0.01
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.01
0.06
0.02
rgb(  
0.01
0
0.37
0.01
0.01
0.02
0
0.07
0.03
0.01
0.03
0
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.01
0
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.09
0
0.03
0.01
asc( 
0.05
0.17
0.05
0.06
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.11
0.19
0.08
0.09
0.17
0.16
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.17
0.04
0.02
0
0.06
0.08
0.09
0.24
0.02
0.17
0.05
getobject(  
0.02
0.01
0.17
0.02
0.01
0.09
0.5
0.08
0.05
0.16
0.11
0.01
0.06
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.06
0
0.06
0.05
0.01
0.01
0
0.02
w
rite( 
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.15
0.3
0.18
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.09
0
0.1
0.08
0.05
0.03
0.08
0.06
0
0.25
0.04
0.03
0.2
0.02
replace( 
0.15
0.02
0.07
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.26
0.32
0.07
0.02
0.02
0.11
0.06
0.05
0.08
0.13
0.04
0.02
0.09
0.05
0.25
0
0.13
0.02
0.12
0
w
script 
0.02
0.09
0.05
0.07
0.01
0.16
0.04
0.72
0.06
0.06
0.15
0.04
0.07
0.05
0.08
0.13
0.37
0.06
0.09
0.24
0.01
0.04
0.13
0
0.04
0.33
0.1
ltrim
( 
0.01
0
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0
0.05
0.03
0.01
0.03
0
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.07
0.01
0
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.04
0
0.03
0.01
hkey_local_m
achine  
0.03
0.03
0.09
0.17
0
0.18
0.03
0.13
0.16
0
0.38
0.03
0.08
0.12
0.08
0.05
0.18
0.06
0.03
0.17
0
0.2
0.12
0.33
0.03
0
0.07
w
riteblanklines( 0.02
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.01
0
0.3
0.03
0.17
0.01
0.22
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.09
0.02
0.01
0.05
0.02
0.02
0
0.1
0.01
0.07
0
low
 correlation
0.29
M
edium
 correlation
0.59
H
ighly correlated
1
 
 
F
igure 5. 3: C
olor m
ap of E
lem
ents’ C
orrelation for M
alicious codes 
73 
N
orm
al
.num
ber 
cstr(  array( hkey_users   
second(  
hkey_classes_root  
.description  
.scriptfullnam
e 
w
riteline( 
scriptengine 
hkey_current_user  
hex( echo rnd(  .argum
ents 
.specialfolders( 
readall  
clng(  rgb(  asc( 
getobject(  
w
rite( replace( 
w
script 
ltrim
( hkey_local_m
achine  
w
riteblanklines( 
.num
ber 
0
0.43
0.21
0.12
0.01
0.2
0.48
0.12
0.08
0.15
0.03
0.42
0.11
0.02
0.39
0.03
0
0.4
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.05
0.02
0.29
0.19
0.12
0.2
cstr(  
0.43
0
0.24
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.36
0.05
0.15
0.01
0.02
0.42
0.11
0.01
0.34
0.02
0.03
0.46
0.01
0.01
0.07
0.07
0.01
0.21
0.1
0.19
0.02
array( 
0.21
0.24
0
0.02
0.08
0.04
0.16
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.42
0.09
0.02
0.45
0.03
0.03
0.14
0.11
0.02
0.11
0.11
0.02
0.08
0.06
0.11
0.05
hkey_users   
0.12
0.01
0.02
0
0
0.42
0.12
0
0
0.82
0.47
0.16
0.04
0
0.1
0
0
0.01
0
0
0.05
0.05
0
0.27
0.03
0
0.21
second(  
0.01
0.01
0.08
0
0
0
0.01
0
0
0
0
0.01
0.03
0
0.01
0
0
0
0.5
0
0.04
0.04
0
0
0.04
0
0.01
hkey_classes_root  
0.2
0.02
0.04
0.42
0
0
0.19
0.5
0.01
0.35
0.19
0.27
0.1
0.01
0.16
0.01
0.01
0.33
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.16
0.08
0
0.36
.description  
0.48
0.36
0.16
0.12
0.01
0.19
0
0.11
0.08
0.14
0.03
0.3
0.21
0.09
0.22
0.03
0
0.29
0.02
0.09
0.1
0.1
0.02
0.16
0.21
0.02
0.07
.scriptfullnam
e 0.12
0.05
0.04
0
0
0.5
0.11
0
0.06
0.01
0.18
0.18
0.04
0.01
0.09
0.11
0.01
0.4
0.01
0.16
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.09
0
0.33
w
riteline( 
0.08
0.15
0.05
0
0
0.01
0.08
0.06
0
0.01
0.01
0.13
0.07
0.01
0.21
0.1
0.08
0.02
0.01
0.14
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.03
0.08
0
0.02
scriptengine 
0.15
0.01
0.03
0.82
0
0.35
0.14
0.01
0.01
0
0.38
0.2
0.05
0
0.12
0
0
0.01
0
0
0.06
0.06
0
0.22
0.04
0
0.17
hkey_current_user  
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.47
0
0.19
0.03
0.18
0.01
0.38
0
0.06
0.03
0
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0
0.09
0.09
0.01
0.12
0.07
0
0.35
hex( 
0.42
0.42
0.42
0.16
0.01
0.27
0.3
0.18
0.13
0.2
0.06
0
0.19
0.01
0.54
0.02
0.02
0.33
0.05
0.01
0.07
0.07
0.02
0.08
0.14
0.16
0.1
echo 
0.11
0.11
0.09
0.04
0.03
0.1
0.21
0.04
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.19
0
0.05
0.3
0.05
0.03
0.14
0.06
0.05
0.24
0.24
0.03
0
0.83
0.04
0.05
rnd(  
0.02
0.01
0.02
0
0
0.01
0.09
0.01
0.01
0
0
0.01
0.05
0
0.02
0
0
0.01
0
0.67
0.06
0.06
0
0.22
0.06
0
0.01
.argum
ents 
0.39
0.34
0.45
0.1
0.01
0.16
0.22
0.09
0.21
0.12
0.02
0.54
0.3
0.02
0
0.03
0.05
0.32
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.22
0.33
0.1
0.15
.specialfolders( 0.03
0.02
0.03
0
0
0.01
0.03
0.11
0.1
0
0.01
0.02
0.05
0
0.03
0
0.01
0.01
0
0.23
0.09
0.09
0
0.01
0.06
0
0.01
readall  
0
0.03
0.03
0
0
0.01
0
0.01
0.08
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0
0.05
0.01
0
0.01
0.01
0
0.05
0.05
0.16
0.05
0.07
0
0.03
clng(  
0.4
0.46
0.14
0.01
0
0.33
0.29
0.4
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.33
0.14
0.01
0.32
0.01
0.01
0
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.31
0.12
0.26
0.2
rgb(  
0.02
0.01
0.11
0
0.5
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0
0.01
0.05
0.06
0
0.03
0
0.01
0.01
0
0
0.07
0.07
0
0.01
0.07
0
0.01
asc( 
0.02
0.01
0.02
0
0
0.01
0.09
0.16
0.14
0
0
0.01
0.05
0.67
0.02
0.23
0
0.01
0
0
0.06
0.06
0
0.22
0.03
0
0.01
getobject(  
0.05
0.07
0.11
0.05
0.04
0.01
0.1
0.03
0.12
0.06
0.09
0.07
0.24
0.06
0.04
0.09
0.05
0.02
0.07
0.06
0
1
0.01
0.1
0.12
0.05
0.05
w
rite( 
0.05
0.07
0.11
0.05
0.04
0.01
0.1
0.03
0.12
0.06
0.09
0.07
0.24
0.06
0.04
0.09
0.05
0.02
0.07
0.06
1
0
0.01
0.1
0.12
0.05
0.05
replace( 
0.02
0.01
0.02
0
0
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.12
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0
0.03
0
0.16
0.01
0
0
0.01
0.01
0
0.09
0.02
0
0.07
w
script 
0.29
0.21
0.08
0.27
0
0.16
0.16
0.04
0.03
0.22
0.12
0.08
0
0.22
0.22
0.01
0.05
0.31
0.01
0.22
0.1
0.1
0.09
0
0.07
0.27
0.28
ltrim
( 
0.19
0.1
0.06
0.03
0.04
0.08
0.21
0.09
0.08
0.04
0.07
0.14
0.83
0.06
0.33
0.06
0.07
0.12
0.07
0.03
0.12
0.12
0.02
0.07
0
0.03
0.13
hkey_local_m
achine  
0.12
0.19
0.11
0
0
0
0.02
0
0
0
0
0.16
0.04
0
0.1
0
0
0.26
0
0
0.05
0.05
0
0.27
0.03
0
0.01
w
riteblanklines( 0.2
0.02
0.05
0.21
0.01
0.36
0.07
0.33
0.02
0.17
0.35
0.1
0.05
0.01
0.15
0.01
0.03
0.2
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.05
0.07
0.28
0.13
0.01
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
igure 5. 4: C
olor m
ap of E
lem
ents’ C
orrelation for N
orm
al  codes 
low
 correlation
0.29
M
edium
 correlation
0.59
H
ighly correlated
1
 74 
low
 correlation
0.29
M
edium
 correlation
0.59
H
ighly correlated
1
C
om
bined
.num
ber 
cstr(  array( hkey_users   
second(  
hkey_classes_root  
.description  
.scriptfullnam
e 
w
riteline( 
scriptengine 
hkey_current_user  
hex( 
echo rnd(  .argum
ents 
.specialfolders( 
readall  
clng(  rgb(  asc( 
getobject(  
w
rite( replace( 
w
script 
ltrim
( hkey_local_m
achine  
w
riteblanklines( 
.num
ber 
0
0.42
0.21
0.06
0.02
0.09
0.47
0.05
0.01
0.06
0.01
0.41
0.13
0.03
0.39
0.04
0.04
0.37
0.02
0.05
0.01
0.06
0.18
0.15
0.09
0.09
0.03
cstr(  
0.42
0
0.24
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.36
0.05
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.42
0.12
0.02
0.34
0.02
0.05
0.44
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.04
0.11
0.07
0.15
0.02
0.02
array( 
0.21
0.24
0
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.18
0.1
0.03
0
0.07
0.41
0.11
0.03
0.45
0.04
0.06
0.13
0.13
0.05
0.16
0.05
0.03
0.04
0.08
0.03
0.03
hkey_users   
0.06
0.02
0.03
0
0.01
0.21
0.03
0.09
0.1
0.18
0.35
0.05
0
0.09
0.02
0.01
0.11
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.08
0.1
0.09
0.05
0
0.21
0.18
second(  
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0
0.16
0.02
0.05
0.01
0.01
0.23
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.06
0.01
0.2
0.01
0.06
0.01
0.01
0
0
0.03
0.01
hkey_classes_root  
0.09
0.03
0.05
0.21
0.16
0
0.09
0.25
0.04
0.21
0.2
0.15
0.01
0.01
0.1
0.02
0.22
0.18
0.01
0.01
0.07
0.09
0.11
0.11
0.01
0.29
0.16
.description  
0.47
0.36
0.18
0.03
0.02
0.09
0
0.08
0.01
0.05
0.03
0.31
0.23
0.03
0.24
0.04
0.09
0.28
0.02
0.02
0.17
0.07
0.06
0.17
0.02
0.01
0.03
.scriptfullnam
e 0.05
0.05
0.1
0.09
0.05
0.25
0.08
0
0.16
0.14
0.23
0.02
0.16
0.02
0.07
0.18
0.53
0.1
0.02
0.13
0.33
0.17
0.03
0.29
0.03
0.33
0.06
w
riteline( 
0.01
0.05
0.03
0.1
0.01
0.04
0.01
0.16
0
0.02
0.13
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.04
0.2
0.03
0.01
0.24
0.2
0.35
0.27
0.09
0.01
0.19
0.22
scriptengine 
0.06
0.02
0
0.18
0.01
0.21
0.05
0.14
0.02
0
0.15
0.09
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.09
0.07
0.18
0.06
0.05
0
0.09
0.18
hkey_current_user  
0.01
0.02
0.07
0.35
0.23
0.2
0.03
0.23
0.13
0.15
0
0.01
0.06
0.16
0.05
0.02
0.29
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.17
0.17
0.09
0.11
0.01
0.42
0.23
hex( 
0.41
0.42
0.41
0.05
0.01
0.15
0.31
0.02
0.03
0.09
0.01
0
0.2
0.02
0.54
0.03
0.06
0.31
0.04
0.01
0.11
0.05
0.03
0.12
0.13
0.03
0.05
echo 
0.13
0.12
0.11
0
0.05
0.01
0.23
0.16
0.03
0.03
0.06
0.2
0
0.06
0.31
0.02
0.13
0.12
0.05
0.14
0.31
0.12
0.09
0.66
0.02
0.13
0.04
rnd(  
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.09
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.16
0.02
0.06
0
0.03
0.01
0.15
0.01
0.01
0.1
0.08
0.11
0.06
0
0
0.1
0.01
.argum
ents 
0.39
0.34
0.45
0.02
0.02
0.1
0.24
0.07
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.54
0.31
0.03
0
0.04
0.06
0.31
0.02
0.06
0.11
0.07
0.09
0.28
0.08
0.03
0.02
.specialfolders( 0.04
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.04
0.18
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.04
0
0.17
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.11
0.02
0.02
0.09
0.01
0.06
0.01
readall  
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.11
0.06
0.22
0.09
0.53
0.2
0.03
0.29
0.06
0.13
0.15
0.06
0.17
0
0
0.02
0.03
0.27
0.29
0.21
0.19
0.04
0.28
0
clng(  
0.37
0.44
0.13
0.01
0.01
0.18
0.28
0.1
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.31
0.12
0.01
0.31
0.02
0
0
0.01
0.02
0
0.03
0.17
0.11
0.2
0.09
0.01
rgb(  
0.02
0.01
0.13
0.01
0.2
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.05
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0
0.01
0.06
0.01
0.01
0.08
0
0.02
0.01
asc( 
0.05
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.13
0.24
0.09
0.02
0.01
0.14
0.1
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
0.14
0.17
0.17
0.07
0.01
0.03
0.01
getobject(  
0.01
0.02
0.16
0.08
0.06
0.07
0.17
0.33
0.2
0.07
0.17
0.11
0.31
0.08
0.11
0.11
0.27
0
0.06
0.14
0
0.19
0.16
0.05
0.04
0.12
0.05
w
rite( 
0.06
0.04
0.05
0.1
0.01
0.09
0.07
0.17
0.35
0.18
0.17
0.05
0.12
0.11
0.07
0.02
0.29
0.03
0.01
0.17
0.19
0
0.27
0.06
0.01
0.26
0.02
replace( 
0.18
0.11
0.03
0.09
0.01
0.11
0.06
0.03
0.27
0.06
0.09
0.03
0.09
0.06
0.09
0.02
0.21
0.17
0.01
0.17
0.16
0.27
0
0.02
0.14
0.24
0.09
w
script 
0.15
0.07
0.04
0.05
0
0.11
0.17
0.29
0.09
0.05
0.11
0.12
0.66
0
0.28
0.09
0.19
0.11
0.08
0.07
0.05
0.06
0.02
0
0.04
0.2
0.07
ltrim
( 
0.09
0.15
0.08
0
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.01
0
0.01
0.13
0.02
0
0.08
0.01
0.04
0.2
0
0.01
0.04
0.01
0.14
0.04
0
0.01
0
hkey_local_m
achine  
0.09
0.02
0.03
0.21
0.03
0.29
0.01
0.33
0.19
0.09
0.42
0.03
0.13
0.1
0.03
0.06
0.28
0.09
0.02
0.03
0.12
0.26
0.24
0.2
0.01
0
0.18
w
riteblanklines( 0.03
0.02
0.03
0.18
0.01
0.16
0.03
0.06
0.22
0.18
0.23
0.05
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.01
0
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.02
0.09
0.07
0
0.18
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F
igure 5. 5: C
olor m
ap of E
lem
ents’ C
orrelation for C
om
bined codes 
 75 
 
After the computation of the correlation matrix for malicious, normal, and combined 
scripts (normal and malicious scripts together), the correlation between the elements in 
the three matrices is inconsistent; this implies that all the elements are needed to be taken 
into account (i.e. there is no correlation between them) to perform the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors computation. 
5.4.3 Eigenvectors and Eigenvalues 
Matlab is used to perform the computation of eigenvalues and eigenvectors. In general, 
once the eigenvectors are computed from the covariance matrix, and then they are sorted 
according to their highest eigenvalues to give the elements that constitute the components 
an order of significance. So, the decision can easily be made at this stage to ignore the 
components of lesser significance while keeping those of higher significance, see Table 
5. 7. 
 
Table 5. 7: Elements sorted in descending order according to their eigenvalues  
Write 3.70 
Readall 3.35 
.scriptfullname 1.92 
asc( 1.54 
day( 1.44 
.description 1.24 
getobject( 1.20 
hkey_current_user 1.10 
hkey_users 1.07 
hex( 1.04 
second( 1.00 
cstr( 0.94 
minute( 0.87 
scriptenginemajorversion 0.80 
writeline( 0.78 
scriptengine 0.77 
.line 0.70 
rnd( 0.69 
month( 0.61 
Space( 0.53 
escape( 0.49 
unescape( 0.48 
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exec( 0.46 
Exists( 0.41 
computername 0.37 
.arguments 0.30 
createshortcut 0.18 
targetpath 0.00 
 
5.4.4 Selection of Principal Components   
The resulting principal components were ordered according to their highest eigenvalues 
and several trials were taken in order to select the optimal number of principal 
components. The selection was bounded by the fact that selecting a high number of 
components will increase the system accuracy yet on the expense of complicating the 
calculations. On the other side, reducing the number of principal components on which 
the system is build would simplify its design yet would sacrifice the quality of the 
detection. 
Several trials led to selecting 70% (as a cutoff threshold) to select the principal 
components. This choice led the selection of 20 elements representing the principal 
components of the system, as shown in Table 5. 8 below, these principal components, 
constitute the secondary filter to differentiate between normal and malicious scripts 
without sacrificing the system accuracy such as the high detection rate, and low rate of 
false alarms.  
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Table 5. 8: The feature vectors (the principal components) that constitute the secondary 
filter: 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These keywords can be identified in two distinct subcategories inVBScript attacks such 
as:  
Registry related keywords (hkey_users, hkey_current_user) which are mostly used in 
attacks to register the virus on the infected machine 
File structure related keywords (getobject, write(), writeline(), readall) which are 
used to alter the file structure 
The presence of all these elements in a script provides enough evidence for suspecting an 
attack. 
Figure 5. 6 illustrates this by plotting the first two principal components that have higher 
significance. Principal component 1 (Write) on the X axis against principal component 2 
(readall) on the Y axis for normal and malicious scripts. These two principal components 
can easily identify and separate malicious from normal scripts.  
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Figure 5. 6 : The relation between Principal Component 1 (Write) and Principal Component 2 
(Readall) that separates malicious from normal scripts. 
 
5.5 Testing & Results 
 
Detection will be based on Euclidean distance measured from the center of benign code 
(the mean of the class of normal script). Two detection methods were assumed based on 
whether the center of malicious code is used or not. 
1. Detection Method 1: A code is malicious if the distance from the center of 
benign code is greater than the distance from the center of malicious code, i.e. the 
code is closer to the center of the malicious code than to the benign. In this 
detection method, the center of malicious is maintained to reflect the updated 
attacks.  See  Figure 5. 7. 
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                       Figure 5. 7: Detection Method 1. 
 
2. Detection Method 2: In this detection method, if the distance from the center of 
benign code exceeds a certain threshold ‘h’, the script is assumed to be malicious. 
The center of malicious is not used and the system depends wholly on maintaining 
a clean code base. See Figure 5. 8. 
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                        Figure 5. 8 : Detection Method 2. 
 
 
The first detection method offers a higher detection performance because it uses both the 
center of malicious and center of normal in the detection; while the second method offers 
the flexibility of changing the detection threshold and thus balancing the false positives 
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and false negatives. This is due to the fact that choosing a bigger threshold from the 
center of clean (mean of the clean class) will result in low false positives and high false 
negatives and choosing a small threshold from the center of clean will result in high false 
positives and low false negatives. 
In order to test the performance of the detection, the following performance measures are 
used 
1. True Positives (TP): number of malicious sources correctly classified as malicious 
2. True Negatives (TN): number of benign sources correctly classified as benign 
3. False Positives (FP): number of benign sources falsely classified as malicious 
4. False Negatives (FN): number of malicious sources falsely classified as benign 
5. Detection rate (DR): percentage of number of malicious sources correctly 
detected over all malicious sources (TP/(TP+FN)) 
6. False Positive rate (FPR): percentage of number of benign sources falsely 
detected over all benign code (FP/(TN+FP)) 
7. False Negative Rate (FNR): percentage of malicious code sources falsely 
undetected  over all malicious code (FN/(TP+FN)) 
8. Overall Accuracy (OA): percentage of number of correctly detected sources (both 
benign and malicious) over all available sources (benign and malicious), 
(TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN) 
5.5.1 Experiment with known data 
The first experiment is to use the same data set for training and testing. The following 
Table 5. 9 summarizes the results as tested on both detection methods. For the second 
detection method, three threshold points were selected in order to illustrate the difference, 
 
 Detection 
Method 1 
Detection 
Method 2 (h=1) 
Detection 
Method 2 (h=2) 
Detection 
Method 2 (h=3) 
FPR 2% 30% 12% 5% 
FNR 26% 14% 29% 47% 
DR 74% 86% 71% 53% 
OA 93% 73% 85% 86% 
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Table 5. 9: Summary of experiment with known data 
 
It is clear from the results that by using the center of malicious code, in addition to the 
normal profile in detection method 1, the false positive rate is minimized and the overall 
system accuracy is improved. So, the false positive rate was 2%, detection rate was 74%, 
and overall accuracy was 93%. 
In order to illustrate the impact of choosing different threshold points, the following 
graph in Figure 5. 9 will show the variation of different key indicators such as false 
negative rate, false positive rate, and the overall accuracy against selecting different 
thresholds in detection method 2. 
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Figure 5. 9 : IDS Performance. 
 
Figure 5. 9 shows that in order to maximize the overall system accuracy, the attack 
classifier should be operated at a level of h in the range 1< h< 3. Different operating 
points result in different false positive and false negative rates. Increasing h towards the 
higher end of the operating range will result in minimizing the false positive rate, while 
selecting a low h will result in minimizing the false negative rate.  
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Figure 5. 10 depicts the relation between false positive rate and false negative rate in 
detection method 2 while varying the threshold 1< h< 3. 
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Figure 5. 10: Relation between False Positive Rate and False Negative  in Detection Method 2. 
 
The results of the second detection method (see Table 5. 9) show that at 12% false alarm 
rate, the detection rate was 75%. These results were compared with the results of 
Cunningham [19] who proposes a neural-network system to classify the nature of the 
attack. Although neural networks give better results this is due to the use of various 
examples during the learning phase.  It was found that in C detector at a similar false 
alarm rate, the detection rate achieved was in excess of 90%, while the Shell detector 
yielded a detection rate similar to the proposed system 80%.  
The results of both the proposed system and the shell detector give approximately similar 
results; the reason for this is that script languages are less structured, hence less 
predictable, than in structured language such as C.  
The following curve in Figure 5. 11 shows the ROC curve (Receiver Operating 
Characteristic) [27]  which is an aggregate of the probability of false alarms and the 
probability of detection measurements. The X axis shows the percentage of detected 
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attacks (DR) against the false alarm percentage. It is used to illustrate the results of the 
second method of detection applied over the seen data.  
Comparing the ROC curve of the proposed system with the ROC curve for the (C 
detector, and Shell detector) in Cunningham [19], it was found that the ROC curve for the 
C detector outperforms both the proposed system and the Shell detector while the ROC 
curve for the proposed system is similar to the ROC curve of the Shell detector  
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Figure 5. 11: ROC curve using the second method of detection applied over the seen data 
5.5.2 Cross validation over unseen data 
The following step is to test the system over 5-folds cross validation test. The purpose of 
the test is to highlight the impact of using the system in a real- life scenario, where the 
incoming data to the classifier will be unseen, and the normal profile (as well as the 
malicious center) is pre-calculated over a fixed set of data. 
 
The experiment studies the impact of training the system over 80% of the original data 
set. The outcome of training is to calculate a new mean (center for both the clean and the 
malicious code) and then to use the new calculated profiles to test the incoming data. 
 
The following Table 5. 10 summarizes the results tested by the system for the 5 folds 
cross validation. It is evident from the results that the average indicators (False Positive 
 84 
Rate, False Negative Rate, Overall Accuracy, and Detection Rate) don’t deviate 
significantly from the first experiment over seen data; it is consistent as well with the 
previous experiment. The second method of detection (based only on a threshold) still 
shows less attractive results in comparison to the first detection method. The first 
detection method offers a higher detection rate because it uses the center of malicious 
during the classification. Thus, a script can be easily classified as a malicious or normal 
depending on its distance from the center of benign and the center of malicious codes. 
 
Detection Method 1 Fold 1 Fold 2 Fold 3 Fold 4 Fold 5 
    FPR 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 
   FNR 25% 21% 22% 25% 25% 
   DR 75% 79% 78% 75% 75% 
    OA 93% 93% 93% 92% 93% 
Detection Method 2 Fold 1 Fold 2 Fold 3 Fold 4 Fold 5 
h = 1   FPR 30% 30% 30% 28% 28% 
   FNR 14% 14% 14% 14% 14% 
   DR 86% 86% 86% 86% 86% 
    OA 73% 73% 73% 75% 75% 
h = 2   FPR 12% 12% 12% 12% 11% 
   FNR 29% 29% 29% 31% 29% 
   DR 71% 71% 71% 69% 71% 
    OA 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 
h = 3   FPR 5% 5% 5% 4% 5% 
   FNR 47% 47% 47% 58% 47% 
   DR 53% 53% 53% 42% 53% 
    OA 86% 86% 86% 85% 87% 
 
 
5 folds 
Average 
Detection  
Method 1 
Detection  
Method 2 (h =1) 
Detection  
Method 2 (h =2) 
Detection  
Method 2 (h =3) 
FPR 3% 29% 11% 5% 
FNR 24% 14% 29% 49% 
DR 76% 86% 71% 51% 
OA 93% 74% 85% 86% 
Table 5. 10: Summary of cross validation results. 
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The following graph in Figure 5. 12 shows the ROC curve for the 5 folds cross 
validation. It is noticed also that the curve is largely similar to the ROC curve generated 
from the experiment over known data. 
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Figure 5. 12:  ROC Curve for the 5 folds Cross Validation. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Work 
 
6.1 Research Summary 
 
The need for dynamic content, feature-rich Web sites has lead to the adoption of various 
scripting languages. JavaScript, and VBScript are perhaps two of the commonly used 
ones nowadays. Designed with flexibility in mind, the adoption of these technologies 
within popular Internet applications and operating systems has led to the widespread 
problem of viruses, Trojan horses, worms, and script attacks. 
 
Web Script codes are transmitted as source codes over the Internet and are automatically 
executed on any target machine. Accordingly they are hardware independent. This feature 
is among other features of VBScripts that make it receiving increasing focus as a 
backdoor for attacking computers by threatening the user’s computer through sending 
itself in e-mail attachment or through browsing an infected site. What also led to the 
widespread of malicious attacks in VBScript is that malicious script can restrict its 
activity to unnoticeable levels by changing the windows registry, causing loss of data, 
and then spreading itself to infect other systems. 
 
Commercial virus scanners are the first line of defense that protect against these malicious 
mobile codes. They can effectively detect known attacks, but are not able to effectively 
detect new types of attacks. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) fill this role and usually 
form the last line of defense against any kinds of attacks. They are useful not only in 
detecting successful break- ins, but also in monitoring attempts to breach security. 
 
The thesis presented the use of Anomaly host based IDS to limit the damages caused by 
malicious VBScript attacks. It is based on two main assumptions: the majority of 
malicious codes exhibit different behaviors in comparison to normal codes, at the same 
time the codes within each group share common patterns. The code patterns exhibited in 
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malicious VBScripts are unique to attack codes and record very low presence in normal 
VBScripts. The results reached in the thesis have proved both hypotheses. 
 
The proposed anomaly host based IDS uses Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a 
multivariate statistical technique, that identifies patterns in script codes by highlighting 
their similarities and differences. Getting relations in this problem that combine a group 
of VBScript features is computationally expensive and are hard to find. PCA is used to 
reduce the dimensionality of data in which a large number of variables (243 elements) are 
interrelated. PCA accomplishes this by computing a smaller set (20 Principal 
Components) of uncorrelated variables which best represent the original data. Therefore, 
it can easily detect VBScripts with malicious behavior and allow for normal scripts to 
bypass. 
 
A working implementation has been developed and tested against real viruses (malicious 
VBScripts) collected from various sources. Two types of experiments were used to train 
and test the system: experiment over known VBScript and experiment over unseen 
VBScript (5 fold cross validation). The testing carried over the developed system showed 
that the proposed scheme has a good detection rate with low false alarms. The first 
detection method over seen and unseen data shows that the use of the center of malicious 
plays an important role in enhancing the overall system accuracy to (94%). However, the 
limitation of the first detection method is the 26% high rate of false negatives.  
 
The second detection method offers the flexibility of using different threshold points and 
thus, balancing the false positives and false negatives. The system delivers a good job in 
detecting VBScript attacks. It has 10% false positive, 29% false negative, and 75% 
detection rate. Comparing these results with the results of Cunningham  [19] who 
proposes a neural-network system to classify the attacks (developed in C and Unix Shell 
Scripts), it was found that VBScripts are more difficult to accurately classify than attacks 
developed in more structured languages (e.g. C). The C detector has 10% false alarms 
and 98% detection rate. On the other hand, the proposed system yields similar results 
when compared to Unix Shell detector, it has 80% detection rate. 
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Finally, the system is robust; it performed well in training and detection. Training the 
system has a complexity of O (n2) which is the complexity of matrix conversion. While 
the system detection which is based on Euclidean distance (a simple distance measure) 
uses a small feature vectors (20 principal components) in detection. Thus, it doesn’t have 
a bad impact on system performance and computing resources. Both detection method 1 
and detection method 2 performed well, they have a complexity of O ( n). 
6.2 Contributions 
 
The main contribution in this thesis is proposing an extension on Cunningham’s work 
[19] through the detection of source codes of attacks from malicious VBScripts. Script 
coding such as VBScripts dominate the vast majority of internet script utilization; 
however, the literature available to present did not sufficiently address the problem of 
malicious VBScripts as a backdoor of attacking many computers. Thus, using an anomaly 
host based IDS that limits the damage caused by malicious VBScripts addresses a serious 
research gap. One of the key benefits of the introduced IDS is that it is not signature-
based, therefore it handles a class of malicious codes, and active scripting based attacks 
rather than specific instances. As a result, it addresses both future and unknown active 
scripting attacks. 
 
The use of Principal Component Analysis (a Multivariate statistical technique) for 
extracting benign profile also proved advantageous. First, it does not have any 
distributional assumption compared to other statistical based intrusion detection methods 
which usually assume a normal distribution profile. Secondly, it is typical for the data of 
this problem to be high dimensional. Hence, in the proposed scheme, robust PCA is 
applied to reduce the dimensionality in order to build a classifier that depends only on the 
principal components. PCA reduces the dimension of the data without sacrificing its 
valuable information. Only a few parameters of principal components need to be retained 
for future detection. 
 
Finally, the proposed classifier is based on a simple distance instead of using Neural 
Networks (NNs) in classification as followed by Cunningham. The proposed scheme is 
based on Euclidean distance and thus it is direct and simple. Its advantageous nature 
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comes from the minimum time it takes to classify. The mean class values are used as 
class centers; a script is classified as belonging to malicious class, if the distance from 
benign profile is beyond a certain threshold that can be changed to optimize the operation 
of the classifier.  
6.3 Future work 
 
Future work based on this thesis could be divided into various directions: 
1. A key benefit of the proposed system is its low false positive rate of 2% in detection 
method 1, a misuse IDS system on the other hand usually delivers a low false 
negative rate. Signature-based systems can identify previously unseen attacks that are 
abstractly equivalent to known patterns. As they are inherently unable to detect truly 
novel attacks and suffer from false positive rates. So the primary strength of anomaly 
detection is its ability to recognize novel attacks. The main drawback though is the 
difficulty of tracking natural changes; these changes can cause false alarms, while 
intrusive activities that appear to be normal can cause missed detection. Thus, the 
introduced IDS can benefit from the advantages of both techniques. Using a 
combined misuse and anomaly detection will tackle the drawback in each technique. 
So the introduced IDS could easily detect previous attacks as well as new and unseen 
ones with low rate of false alarms. 
 
2. Increasing the size of the proposed problem by using more examples of VBScript 
attacks and dividing the malicious class into several classes such as changing a 
registry, infection, replication classes. Then, PCA will be applied as a classifier to 
determine which type of attacks has performed in order to prevent further attacks. 
 
3. Test the use of PCA as a classifier (instead of neural networks) when applied on 
Cunningham’s proposed work [19]  and compare its results with the proposed system. 
 
4. The use of PCA as a classifier was chosen based on its simplicity in classification. 
Other methods of classification that uses different distance metrics, as well as 
different detection techniques (e.g. neural networks) can be tested to check its impact 
 90 
on the system’s results. There might be a tradeoff between speed of classification and 
system accuracy. 
 
5. Although VBScript is one of the most widespread scripting languages on the web, 
other language (e.g., Java) and scripting language (e.g. JavaScript) are still in use and 
do present significant security holes. The proposed system can be extended by adding 
different language specific feature extraction. 
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Appendix A 
              Parser 
 
#include "Ftest4.h" 
/*****************************************************/ 
char Elements[MAXELEMENTS][MAXLINELEN]; 
int ElementsRepetition[MAXELEMENTS][MAXFILES]; 
int ElementsOccuranceFlag[MAXELEMENTS][MAXFILES]; 
float CumulativePercentOccurance[MAXELEMENTS]; 
float Correlation[MAXELEMENTS][MAXELEMENTS]; 
int LineEvaluate(char *virline,char *elementline); 
int numfiles=0,numelements=0; 
/***************************************************** 
Program Steps 
------------- 
1) Open the feature file 
2) Create the output file for the analysis 
3) Read the elements of the feature 
4) Fill the 'ElementsRepetition' matrix 
5) Fill the 'ElementsOccuranceFlag' matrix 
6) Fill the 'CumulativePercentOccurance' matrix 
7) Fill the 'Correlation' matrix 
8) Write output file 
*****************************************************/ 
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) 
{ 
   FILE    *infile,*outfile,*virfile; 
 struct ffblk  filesearchresult; 
   int    filesearchflag; 
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   int    i,j,repeatnum; 
 char     buffer[MAXLINELEN]; 
   char    *LineElement; 
   char    CompleteFileName[MAXLINELEN]; 
   int    UptoElementsOccurance[MAXFILES]; 
 float   
 UptoElementsPercentOccurance[MAXELEMENTS]; 
 
   LineElement = malloc(MAXLINELEN*sizeof(char)); 
   memset(UptoElementsOccurance,0,MAXFILES*sizeof(int)); 
   memset(UptoElementsPercentOccurance,0,MAXELEMENTS*sizeof(float)); 
 
   memset(ElementsRepetition,0,MAXELEMENTS*MAXFILES*sizeof(int)); 
   memset(CumulativePercentOccurance,0,MAXELEMENTS*sizeof(float)); 
 
 if(argc != 4) 
   { 
    printf("\nLooks for the feature in 'in' file then writes \ 
       the analysis in 'out'"); 
    printf("\nover the VBS files in directory 'dir'"); 
      printf("\nFormat : FTEST in out dir \n"); 
      return 0; 
   } 
 
   // 1 - Open the feature file 
   if ((infile = fopen(argv[1], "rt")) == NULL) 
   { 
      printf("\nCan't open input file %s. Press any key to exit \n",argv[1]); 
      return 1; 
   } 
   //////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
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   // 2 - Create the output file for the analysis 
   if ((outfile = fopen(argv[2], "wt")) == NULL) 
   { 
      printf("\nCannot open output file %s. Press any key to exit\n",argv[2]); 
      return 1; 
   } 
   //////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   // 3 - Read the elements of the feature 
 while(!feof(infile)) 
 { 
  fgets(Elements[numelements],MAXLINELEN,infile); 
 
  // if the string is too short, do not count 
      if(strlen(Elements[numelements])>1) 
      { 
   // eliminate last character being '\n' 
         if(Elements[numelements][strlen(Elements[numelements])-1] == '\n') 
    Elements[numelements][strlen(Elements[numelements])-1] 
= 0; 
         StrtoLower(Elements[numelements]); 
     numelements++; 
  } 
 
  if(numelements == MAXELEMENTS) 
      { 
       printf("\nMAX number of elements exceeded (%i).\ 
          Press any key to terminate\n",MAXELEMENTS); 
         getch(); 
       return 1; 
      } 
   } 
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   //////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   // 4 - Fill the 'ElementsRepetition' matrix 
 sprintf(CompleteFileName,"%s%s",argv[3],"\\*.vbs"); 
   filesearchflag = findfirst(CompleteFileName,&filesearchresult,0); 
   while(!filesearchflag) 
   { 
 
 sprintf(CompleteFileName,"%s%s%s",argv[3],"\\",filesearchresult.ff_name); 
 
  if ((virfile = fopen(CompleteFileName,"r")) == NULL) 
    { 
       printf("\nCannot open file %s. Press any key to\ 
           exit\n",filesearchresult.ff_name); 
         getch(); 
         fclose(infile); 
         fclose(outfile); 
         fclose(virfile); 
       return 1; 
    } 
 
      while(!feof(virfile)) 
      { 
   memset(buffer,0,MAXLINELEN*sizeof(char)); 
       if(fgets(buffer,MAXLINELEN,virfile) == NULL) 
          break; 
 
         StrtoLower(buffer); 
 
         for (i=0;i<numelements;i++) 
          ElementsRepetition[i][numfiles]+= LineEvaluate(buffer,Elements[i]); 
      } 
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      fclose(virfile); 
 
    numfiles++; 
  if(numfiles == MAXFILE) 
      { 
       printf("\nMAX number of files exceeded (%i). Press any key to \ 
          exit\n",MAXFILES); 
         getch(); 
         fclose(infile); 
         fclose(outfile); 
         fclose(virfile); 
       return 1; 
      } 
 
      sprintf(CompleteFileName,"%s%s",argv[3],"\\*.vbs"); 
    filesearchflag = findnext(&filesearchresult); 
   } 
   //////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   // 5 - Fill the 'ElementsOccuranceFlag' matrix 
   for(i=0;i<numelements;i++) 
    for(j=0;j<numfiles;j++) 
       if(ElementsRepetition[i][j]) 
          ElementsOccuranceFlag[i][j]=1; 
   //////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   // 6) Fill the 'UptoElementsPercentOccurance' & 
   //  'CumulativePercentOccurance' matrix 
 for(j=0;j<numfiles;j++) 
    for(i=0;i<numelements;i++) 
       if(ElementsRepetition[i][j]) 
          UptoElementsOccurance[j]++; 
 102 
 
 for(j=0;j<numfiles;j++) 
    UptoElementsPercentOccurance[UptoElementsOccurance[j]-1]++; 
 
 for(i=0;i<numelements;i++) 
 
 UptoElementsPercentOccurance[i]=UptoElementsPercentOccurance[i]/numfiles; 
 
 for(i=0;i<numelements;i++) 
  for(j=numelements-1;j>=i;j--) 
       CumulativePercentOccurance[i]+=UptoElementsPercentOccurance[j]; 
 
   //////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   // 7 - Fill the 'Correlation' matrix 
   for(i=0;i<numelements;i++) 
    for(j=i;j<numelements;j++) 
       Correlation[i][j] = Correlate(ElementsOccuranceFlag[i], 
          ElementsOccuranceFlag[j],numfiles); 
   //////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
   // 8 - Write output file 
   fprintf(outfile,"\n"); 
 fprintf(outfile,"[Analysis Information]\n"); 
   fprintf(outfile,"======================\n"); 
   fprintf(outfile,"Directory of test files  :  %s\n",argv[3]); 
   fprintf(outfile,"Number of files tested   :  %i\n",numfiles); 
   fprintf(outfile,"\n\n"); 
 
   fprintf(outfile,"Feature file name        :  %s\n",argv[1]); 
   fprintf(outfile,"Number of Elements       :  %i\n",numelements); 
   fprintf(outfile,"\n\n\n"); 
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   fprintf(outfile,"[Elements list]\n"); 
   fprintf(outfile,"===============\n"); 
   fprintf(outfile,"     %-60s  Repetition    Occurance\n","Element"); 
   fprintf(outfile,"     %-60s  ----------    ---------\n","-------"); 
 for(i=0;i<numelements;i++) 
   { 
    fprintf(outfile,"%c - '%-60s'    ",'a'+i,StrtoLower(Elements[i])); 
 
      for(repeatnum=0,j=0;j<numfiles;j++) 
       repeatnum += ElementsRepetition[i][j]; 
    fprintf(outfile,"%3i           ",repeatnum); 
 
      for(repeatnum=0,j=0;j<numfiles;j++) 
       repeatnum += ElementsOccuranceFlag[i][j]; 
    fprintf(outfile,"%3i\n",repeatnum); 
   } 
   fprintf(outfile,"\n\n\n"); 
 
 
 fprintf(outfile,"[Elements Correlation]\n"); 
   fprintf(outfile,"======================\n"); 
 
 fprintf(outfile,"    "); 
 for(i=0;i<numelements;i++) 
    fprintf(outfile,"  %c    ",'a'+i); 
 fprintf(outfile,"\n"); 
 
 fprintf(outfile,"   "); 
 for(i=0;i<numelements;i++) 
    fprintf(outfile,"  ---  "); 
 fprintf(outfile,"\n"); 
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 for(i=0;i<numelements;i++) 
   { 
  fprintf(outfile,"%c : ",'a'+i); 
  for(j=0;j<numelements;j++) 
      { 
   if(j>=i) 
          fprintf(outfile,"%+2.2f  ",Correlation[i][j]); 
         else 
          fprintf(outfile,"       "); 
      } 
      fprintf(outfile,"\n"); 
   } 
   fprintf(outfile,"\n\n\n"); 
 
 
 fprintf(outfile,"[Distribution of Elements Occurance]\n"); 
   fprintf(outfile,"====================================\n"); 
   fprintf(outfile,"%% of feature hit      %% of code population\n"); 
   fprintf(outfile,"----------------      --------------------\n"); 
 for(i=0;i<numelements;i++) 
  fprintf(outfile,"     %05.1f%%                  %05.1f%%\n", 
       (float)(100*(i+1)/numelements),100*CumulativePercentOccurance[i]); 
   //////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
 fclose(infile); 
   fclose(outfile); 
   fclose(virfile); 
 
 return 0; 
} 
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/*****************************************************/ 
char *StrtoLower(char *str) 
{ 
   int i=0; 
 while(str[i]!=0) 
    str[i++] = (char)tolower(str[i]); 
   return str; 
} 
/*****************************************************/ 
float Correlate(int *array1,int *array2,int len) 
{ 
 float  mean1=0.0,mean2=0.0; 
   float  numerator=0.0,denom1=0.0,denom2=0.0; 
   int  i; 
 
   for(i=0;i<len;i++) 
   { 
    mean1 += array1[i]; 
    mean2 += array2[i]; 
 } 
 
   mean1 = mean1/len; 
   mean2 = mean2/len; 
 
 for(i=0;i<len;i++) 
    numerator += (array1[i]-mean1)*(array2[i]-mean2); 
 
 for(i=0;i<len;i++) 
   { 
    denom1 += pow(array1[i],2); 
    denom2 += pow(array2[i],2); 
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   } 
 
   denom1 -= len*pow(mean1,2); 
   denom2 -= len*pow(mean2,2); 
 
   if(denom1 == 0) 
    return -9.99; 
 
   if(denom2 == 0) 
    return -9.99; 
 
   return(numerator/sqrt(denom1*denom2)); 
} 
/*****************************************************/ 
char *TrimSpaces(char *str) 
{ 
   char *output = str; 
 while((str[strlen(str)-1] == ' ') || (str[strlen(str)-1] == '\t')) 
    str[strlen(str)-1] = 0; 
 
 while((output[0] == ' ') || (output[0] == '\t')) 
    output ++; 
 
   strcpy(str,output); 
   return str; 
} 
/*****************************************************/ 
int LineEvaluate(char *virline,char *elementline) 
{ 
 unsigned int i=0; 
   int    j=0,k=0; 
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 char subelement[MAXLINELEN] =""; 
 char substline[MAXLINELEN] =""; 
 
 
   while(i < strlen(elementline)) 
   { 
    if(elementline[i] == '\"') 
      { 
         j=0; 
         i++; 
       do 
         { 
    subelement[j] = elementline[i]; 
            i++; 
            j++; 
         } 
         while(elementline[i] != '\"'); 
 
         subelement[j] = '\0'; 
         substline[k] = (strstr(StrtoLower(virline), 
          StrtoLower(subelement)) == NULL) ? '0' : '1'; 
      } 
      else 
       substline[k] = elementline[i]; 
 
      i++; 
      k++; 
   } 
 
   return(val(substline)); 
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} 
/*****************************************************/ 
int val(char *expression) 
{ 
 unsigned int  i; 
   int     operation; 
 
 char  arg1[MAXLEN]=""; 
 char  arg2[MAXLEN]=""; 
 
 // Removes dummy parentheses , if any . 
 RemoveParentheses(expression); 
 
 // If expression = number , return number , else proceed 
 for(i=0;i<strlen(expression)-1;i++) 
  if( (isdigit(expression[i])==0) && (expression[i]!='.')  ) 
   break; 
 
 if( i==(strlen(expression)-1) ) 
  return(atof(expression)); 
 
 if( (operation = GetLevel(expression,arg1,arg2,1)) == -1 ) 
  if( (operation = GetLevel(expression,arg1,arg2,2)) == -1 ) 
       operation = GetLevel(expression,arg1,arg2,3); 
 
 RemoveParentheses(arg1); 
 RemoveParentheses(arg2); 
 
 switch(operation) 
 { 
  case OR  :  return(val(arg1) || val(arg2)); 
 109 
  case AND :  return(val(arg1) && val(arg2)); 
 } 
} 
/*****************************************************/ 
char *RemoveParentheses(char *input) 
{ 
 int    OpenParentheses=0; 
 unsigned int  i,length_1=strlen(input)-1; 
 
 if( (input[0]!='(') || (input[length_1]!=')') ) 
  return(input); 
 
 for(i=0;i<length_1;i++) 
 { 
  switch(input[i]) 
  { 
   case '(' : OpenParentheses++; break; 
   case ')' : OpenParentheses--; break; 
  } 
  if( OpenParentheses==0 ) 
   return(input); 
 } 
 input[length_1]=0; 
 strcpy(input,&input[1]); 
 
 if( (input[0] =='(') && (input[strlen(input)-1] ==')') ) 
  return(RemoveParentheses(input)); 
 else 
  return(input); 
} 
/*****************************************************/ 
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int GetLevel(char *expression,char *arg1,char *arg2,int level) 
{ 
 int LevelOfParenthese=0; 
 char x[MAXLEN]=""; 
 char C1='\0'; 
 unsigned int i; 
 unsigned short int OP1; 
 
 switch(level) 
 { 
  case 1 : C1='+' ; OP1=OR ; break; 
  case 2 : C1='*' ; OP1=AND ; break; 
 } 
 
 for(i=0;i<strlen(expression);i++) 
 { 
  LevelOfParenthese += (expression[i] == '(')? 1:0; 
  LevelOfParenthese -= (expression[ i] == ')')? 1:0; 
 
  if((expression[i] == C1)&&(LevelOfParenthese==0)) 
  { 
   strncpy(x,expression,i*sizeof(char)); 
   strcpy(arg1,x); 
   strcpy(x,&expression[i+1]); 
   strcpy(arg2,x); 
   return(OP1); 
  } 
 } 
 return(-1); 
} 
/*****************************************************/ 
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Appendix B 
Mathematical Background 
 
This appendix first introduces mathematical concepts that will be used in Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA). It covers standard deviation, covariance, eigenvectors 
and eigenvalues. It is divided into two parts. The first section focuses on Statistics 
which looks at distribution measurements, or, how the data is spread out. The 
second section describes Matrix Algebra and looks at eigenvectors and eigenvalues, 
important properties of matrices that are fundamental to PCA. 
 
1. Statistics 
The entire subject of statistics is based around the idea that given a big set of data, 
and we want to analyze that set in terms of the relationships between the individual 
points in that data set. We are going to look at a few of the measures we can do on a 
set of data, and what they tell about the data itself. 
 
1.1 Standard Deviation 
To understand standard deviation, we need a data set. Statisticians are usually 
concerned with taking a sample of a population. To use election polls as an 
example, the population is all the people in the country, whereas a sample is a 
subset of the population that the statisticians measure. The great thing about 
statistics is that by only measuring a sample of the population, we can work out 
what is most likely to be the measurement if the entire population is used. In this 
statistics section, we are going to assume that our data sets are samples of some 
bigger population.  
Here’s an example set: 
 
 X = [1 2 4 6 12 15 25 45 68 67 65 98] 
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The symbol X is used to refer to this entire set of numbers. If we want to refer to an 
individual number in this data set, we will use subscripts on the symbol X to 
indicate a specific number in this data set to indicate a specific number. Eg. X3 
refers to the 3rd number in X, namely the number 4. Note that X1 is the first number 
in the sequence. Also, the symbol n will be used to refer to the number of elements 
in the set X. There are number of things that we can calculate about a data set. For 
example, we can calculate the mean of the sample. 
 
å ==
n
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i
n
X
X
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The symbol X  indicates the mean of the set X . This formula adds up all the 
numbers and then divide by how many they are. 
Unfortunately, the mean doesn’t tell a lot about the data except for a sort of middle 
point. For example, these two data sets have exactly the same mean 10, but are 
obviously quite different. 
 
[0 8 12 20] and [8 9 11 12] 
           
So what is different about these two sets? It is the spread of the data that is different. 
The Standard Deviation (SD) of a data set is a measure of how spread out the data 
is. The definition of SD is the average distance from the mean of the data set to a 
point. The way to calculate it is to compute the squares of the distance from each 
data point to the mean of the set, add them all up, divide by n-1 and take the 
positive square root. As a formula: 
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Where S  is the usual symbol for standard deviation of a sample.  
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1.2 Variance: 
Variance is another measure of the spread of data in a data set. In fact it is almost 
identical to standard deviation. The formula is this: 
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You will notice that this is simply the standard deviation squared; S2 is the usual 
symbol for variance of a sample. Both these measurements are measures of the 
spread of the data. 
 
1.3 Covariance 
 
The previous two measures are purely 1-dimensional.  However many data sets 
have more than one dimension, and the aim of the statistical analysis of these data 
sets is usually to see if there is any relationship between the dimensions. For 
example, we might have a data set for both the height of all the students in a class, 
and the mark they received for that paper. Statistical analysis is performed to see if 
the height of a student has any effect on their mark. Standard deviation and variance 
only operate on 1 dimension, so that we could only calculate the standard deviation 
for each dimension of the data set independently of the other dimensions. However, 
it is useful to have a similar measure to find out how much the dimensions vary 
from the mean with respect to each other. Covariance is such a measure. 
Covariance is always measured between 2 dimensions. If we calculate the 
covariance between one dimension and itself, you get the variance. So if we had a 3 
dimensional data set (x, y, z) then we could measure the covariance between the x 
and y dimensions, the x and z dimensions, and the y and z dimensions. Measuring 
the covariance between x and x, or y and y, or z and z would give the variance of 
the x, y, and z dimensions respectively. 
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The formula for covariance is very similar to the formula for variance. The formula 
for variance is written like this: 
)1(
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The formula for covariance 
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It is exactly the same except that in the second set of brackets, the X’s are replaced 
by Y’s. “For each data item, multiplying the difference between the x value and the 
mean of x x, by the difference between the y value and the mean of y = Add all 
these up, and divide by (n-1). 
The exact value is not as important as its sign (ie. Positive or negative). If the value 
is positive, as it is here, then that indicates that both dimensions increase together, 
meaning that, in general, as the number of hours of study increased, so did the final 
mark. If the value is negative, then as one dimension increases, the other decreases. 
If we had ended up with a negative covariance here, then that would have said the 
opposite that as the number of hours of study increased the final mark decreased. In 
the last case, if the covariance is zero, it indicates that the two dimensions are 
independent of each other. 
COV(X,Y) is equal to COV(Y,X), this means that they are exactly the same since 
the only difference between  COV(X,Y) and COV(Y,X) is that ))(( YYXX ii -- is 
replaced by ))(( XXYY ii -- . 
 
1.4 The covariance Matrix 
 
Covariance is always measured between 2 dimensions. If we have a data set with 
more than 2 dimensions, there is more than one covariance measurement that can be  
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calculated. For example, in a 3 dimensional data set (dimensions x, y, z), we could 
calculate COV(X,Y), COV(X,Z), COV(Y,Z). 
A useful way to get all the possible covariance values between all the different 
dimensions is to calculate them all and put them in a matrix. So, the definition of 
the covariance matrix for a set of data with dimensions is: 
))Dim,COV(Dim,( Ji,, ==
´
jiji
nm ccC  
Where nmC ´ is a matrix with n rows and n columns, and 
xim
D is the xth dimension. 
The following is an example of the covariance matrix for an imaginary 3 
dimensional data set, using the usual dimensions x, y, and z. Then, the covariance 
matrix has 3 rows and 3 columns, and the values are this: 
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Down the main diagonal, the covariance value is between one of the dimensions 
and itself. These are the variances for that dimension. The other point is that since 
),cov(),cov( abba = the matrix is symmetrical about the main diagonal. 
 
2. Matrix Algebra 
This section provides a background on the matrix algebra required in PCA. 
Specifically it focuses on eigenvectors and eigenvalues of a given matrix.  
2.1 Eigenvectors  
You can multiply two matrices together, provided they are compatible sizes. 
Eigenvectors are a special case of this. Consider the two multiplications between a 
matrix and a vector in the following examples 
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Example of non-eigenvector 
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Example of eigenvector 
 
In the first example, the resulting vector is not an integer multiple of the original 
vector, whereas in the second example, it is exactly 4 times the vector we began 
with. The vector is a vector in a 2 dimensional space. The vector ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
2
3
(from the 
second example multiplication) represents an arrow pointing from the origin (0,0) to 
the point (3,2).The other matrix, the square one, can be thought of as a 
transformation matrix. If we multiply this matrix on the left of a vector, the answer 
is another vector that is transformed from its original position. 
It is the nature of the transformation that the eigenvectors arise from. Imagine a 
transformation matrix that, when multiplied on the left, reflected vectors in the line 
y = x. Then we can see that if there were a vector that lay on the line y = x, it’s a 
reflection itself. This vector and all multiples of it would be an eigenvector of that 
transformation matrix. 
 
The properties of these eigenvectors are:  
1. Eigenvectors can only be found for square matrices. And, not every square 
matrix has eigenvectors. And, given an n × n matrix that does have 
eigenvectors, there are n of them. Given a 3 × 3 matrix, there are 3 eigenvectors. 
 
2. Another property of eigenvectors is that even if we scale the vector by some 
amount before we multiply it, we still get the same multiple of it as a result, as 
in the following example: 
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Examples of how a scaled eigenvector is still an eigenvector. 
 
This is because if we scale a vector by some amount, all you are doing is making it 
longer, not changing it’s direction.  
 
3. Lastly, all the eigenvectors of a matrix are perpendicular, ie. at right angles to 
each other, no matter how many dimensions we have. Another word for 
perpendicular, in math talk, is orthogonal. This is important because it means 
that we can express the data in terms of these perpendicular eigenvectors instead 
of expressing them in terms of the x  and y axes.  
 
Another important thing is that when mathematicians find eigenvectors, they like to 
find the eigenvectors whose length is exactly one. This is because the length of a 
vector doesn’t affect whether it’s an eigenvector or not, whereas the direction does. 
So, in order to keep eigenvectors standard, whenever we find an eigenvector we 
usually scale it to make it have a length of 1, so that all eigenvectors have the same 
length. Here’s a demonstration in the example above. 
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is an eigenvector, and the length of that vector is 
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So we divide the original vector by this much to make it have a length of 1. 
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2.2 Eigenvalues 
Eigenvalues are closely related to eigenvectors, in fact, we saw an eigenvalue like 
in the following example: 
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 The amount by which the original vector was scaled after multiplication by the 
square matrix was the same? In that example, the value was 4. The eigenvalue  is  4  
associated with that eigenvector. No matter what multiple of the eigenvector we 
took before we multiplied it by the square matrix, we would always get 4 times the 
scaled vector. So we can see that eigenvectors and eigenvalues always come in 
pairs. 
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Appendix C 
Principal Components Analysis  
 
This appendix is designed to give an understanding of the process of Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is a useful technique that has found application in 
fields such as face recognition and image compression, and is a common technique for 
finding patterns in data of high dimension. 
Principal Component s Analysis (PCA) is a way of identifying patterns in data, and 
expressing the data in such a way to highlight their similarities and differences. Since 
patterns are hard to find in data of high dimension, where the luxury of graphical 
representation is not available, PCA is a powerful tool for analyzing data. The other main 
advantage of PCA is that once these patterns were found in the data; we can compress the 
data by reducing the number of dimensions, without much loss of information. The 
following section will explain the steps needed to perform PCA on a set of data. 
 
1. Method 
Step 1: Subtracting the mean 
For PCA to work properly, we have to subtract the mean from each of the data 
dimensions. The mean subtracted is the average across each dimension. So, all the x 
values have x  (the mean of the x values of all the data points) subtracted, and all the y 
values have y  subtracted from them. This produces a data set whose mean is zero, See 
Table 1 and Figure 1. 
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     Table 1: PCA example data, original data and data with the means subtracted. 
 
 
 
Data 
x y 
2.5 2.4 
0.5 0.7 
2.2 2.9 
1.9 2.2 
3.1 3.0 
2.3 2.7 
2 1.6 
1 1.1 
1.5 1.6 
1.1 0.9 
Data Adjust 
x y 
0.69 0.49 
-1.31 -1.21 
0.39 0.99 
0.09 0.29 
1.29 1.09 
0.49 0.79 
0.19 -0.31 
-0.81 -0.81 
-0.31 -0.31 
-0.71 -1.01 
PCA example data, original data 
Data with the means subtracted 
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Step 2: Calculating the covariance matrix 
This is done exactly the same way as was discussed earlier. Since the data is 2 
dimensional, the covariance matrix will be 2 ´ 2. 
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=
716555556.0615444444.0
615444444.0616555556.0
COV  
 
So, since the non-diagonal elements in this covariance matrix are positive, we should 
expect that both the X and Y variable increase together. 
 
Step 3: Calculating the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the covariance matrix 
Since the covariance matrix is square, we can calculate the eigenvectors and eigenvalues 
for this matrix. Here are the eigenvectors and eigenvalues. 
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 1 2 3 4 
Original PCA data 
Figure1: Plot of the original data 
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28402771.1
490833989.0
seigenvalue  
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=
735178656.0677873399.0
677873399.0735178656.0
rseigenvecto  
 
It is important to notice that these eigenvectors are both unit eigenvectors ie. their lengths 
are both 1.  The data has quite a strong pattern. As expected from the covariance matrix, 
the two variables do indeed increase together. On top of the data, the eigenvectors were 
plotted. They appear as diagonal dotted lines on the plot. As stated in the eigenvector 
section, they are perpendicular to each other. They provide information about the patterns 
in the data. The eigenvectors go through the middle of the points, like drawing a line of 
best fit. That eigenvector shows how these two data sets are related along that line. The 
second eigenvector gives the other, less important, pattern in the data, that all the points 
follow the main line, but are off to the side of the main line by some amount. 
So, by this process of taking the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix, we have been able 
to extract lines that characterize the data. The rest of the steps involve transforming the 
data so that it is expressed in terms of lines, See Figure 2. 
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Step 4: Choosing components and forming a feature vector 
Here is where the notion of data compression and reduced dimensionality comes 
into it. If we look at the eigenvectors and eigenvalues from the previous section, we 
will notice that the eigenvalues are quite different values. In fact, it turns out that 
the eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue is the principle component of the data 
set. 
In our example, the eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue was the one that pointed 
down the middle of the data. It is the most significant relationship between the data 
dimensions. 
In general, once eigenvectors are found from the covariance matrix, the next step is 
to order them by eigenvalue, highest to lowest. This gives you the components in 
order of significance. Now, if you like, you can decide to ignore the components of 
lesser significance. You do lose some information, but if the eigenvalues are small, 
2 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ + 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-2 
-1.5 
-1 
-0.5 
0 
1 
0.5 
1.5 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 -0.5 1 -1.5 -2 
Mean adjusted data with eigenvectors overlaid 
Figure2: A plot of the normalized data (mean subtracted) with the 
eigenvectors of the covariance matrix overlaid on top. 
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you don’t lose much. If you leave out some components, the final data set will have 
less dimensions than the original, see Table 2 and Figure 3. 
To be precise, if you originally have n dimensions in your data, and so you calculate 
n eigenvectors and eigenvalues, and then you choose only the first P eigenvectors, 
then the final data set has only P dimensions. What needs to be done now is you 
need to form a feature vector for a matrix of vectors. This is constructed by taking 
the eigenvectors that you want to keep from the list of eigenvectors, and forming a 
matrix with these eigenvectors in the columns. 
FeatureVector = (eig1 eig2 eig3…………..eign) 
Given our example set of data, and the fact that we have 2 eigenvectors, we have 
two choices. We can either form a feature vector with both of the eigenvectors. 
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677873399.0735178656.0
735178656.0677873399.0
 
 
 
or, we can choose to leave out the smaller, less significant component and only have 
a single column. 
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735178656.0
677873399.0
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Transformed Data 
x y 
-0.827970186 -0.175115307 
1.77758033 0.142857227 
-0.992197494 0.384374989 
-0.274210416 -0.209498461 
-0.167580142 0.175282444 
0.991094375 -0.349824698 
1.14457276 -0.349824698 
0.438046137 0.177646297 
1.22382056 -0.162675287 
2 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-2 
-1.5 
-1 
-0.5 
0 
1 
0.5 
1.5 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 -0.5 1 -1.5 -2 
Table2: Data transformed with 2 eigenvectors  
Figure 3:The table of data by applying the PCA analysis using both eigenvectors, 
and a plot of the new data points. 
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Appendix D 
 
Malicious VBScript 
VBS1.vbs  
VBS.TripleSix.vbs  
I-Worm.Fiume.vbs  
IIS-Worm.IISWorm.vbs  
Script.ASX.Conp.vbs  
Wordsworth.vbs  
IRC-Worm.Wordsworth.vbs  
VBS.Monopoly.VBS  
MONOPOLY.VBS  
VBS.Nomek.vbs  
JS.Judge.vbs  
VBS.Monopoly.b.VBS  
VBS.Monopoly.c.vbs  
Monopoly.c.vbs  
LovingYou.vbs  
VBS.Devolve.vbs  
virus.vbs  
VBS.Hard.vbs  
Hard.vbs  
Winvader.vbs  
VBS.Charm.vbs  
Zulud.vbs  
VBS.Zulu.d.vbs  
Zulu.d.vbs  
VBS.Zuluc.vbs  
VBS.Zulu.c.vbs  
Alcau.vbs  
Zulu.c.vbs  
virus8.vbs  
Euro2002.vbs  
VBS.Trojan.Toren.vbs  
Script.BRB.vbs  
I-Worm.LoveLetter.VBS  
I-A93F~1.VBS  
Redlof.vbs  
Trip.vbs  
VBS.Zulub.vbs  
VBS.Zulu.b.VBS  
I-Worm.WinXP.vbs  
I-Worm.Croatia.vbs  
VBS.Casel.vbs  
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VBS3.vbs  
Zulu.b.vbs  
I-Worm.Avalon.vbs  
VBS.Missy.VBS  
missy.vbs  
IRC-Worm.Missy.VBS  
Britney.vbs  
VBS.Trojan.Noob.vbs  
VBS.Tunef.vbs  
VBS.LoveLetter.A.vbs  
VBS.Charlene.vbs  
deepblue001.vbs  
VBS.Freelink.vbs  
I-Worm.Lee.VBS  
IIS-Worm.CodeGreen.vbs  
Zulu.vbs  
VBS.Zulu.VBS  
VBS.Phram.b.VBS  
VBS.Sant.vbs  
Sant.vbs  
VBS.Phram.vbs  
Phram.vbs  
VBS.Chango.vbs  
VBS.Saje.vbs  
VBS.Mbop.d.vbs  
Mbop!-Vbs.vbs  
VBS.Enc.vbs  
ZELDA.VBS  
VBS.Tune.i.vbs  
VBS.Tuneb.vbs  
Tune.vbs  
Kristen.vbs  
Mbop!.vbs  
VBS.Dream.b.vbs  
Cheese.vbs  
tripple.vbs  
VBS.Rabfu.vbs  
VBS.Stuckb.vbs  
vbs.dropper.vbs  
VBS.Fela.b.vbs  
Fela.b.vbs  
anna.vbs  
VBS.Navigator.vbs  
PORN_Madonna.JPEG.vbs  
VBS.Trojan.Vanina.b.vbs  
vbs.solved.vbs  
I-Worm.Noon.vbs  
JS.JDV.b.vbs  
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IRC-Worm.generic.doc.VBS  
VBS.Sheep.VBS  
VBS.Cute.vbs  
IRC-Worm.generic.vbs.vbs  
Welcomb.vbs  
IRC-Worm.generic.vbs  
VBS.Reality.VBS  
VBS.Jesus.vbs  
Crystal.c.vbs  
I-691D~1.VBS  
JS1.vbs  
I-Worm.LoveLetter.bk.VBS  
VBS.Unreal.vbs  
VBS.Bogus.vbs  
Bogus.vbs  
VBS.Sunfl.vbs  
VBS.NMVT.vbs  
VBS.Jadra.vbs  
Like_A_Virgin.MP3.vbs  
JS.Fmtdrv.b.vbs  
VBS.LaMEr0nE.vbs  
VBS.Hustle.vbs  
VBS.ChiQui.vbs  
Hustle.vbs  
VBS.Harana.vbs  
VBS.IntendedDrambui.vbs  
VBS.Intended.Drambui.vbs  
virus2.vbs  
kileer.VBS  
VBS.Yozisa.vbs  
VBS.Yozis.vbs  
Inzane.vbs  
VBS.Crystal.b.VBS  
Crystal.a1.vbs  
VBS.Crystal.c.vbs  
Crazzzy.c.vbs  
Sheep.vbs  
VBS.Bound.vbs  
MSBound.vbs  
JS.Charlene.vbs  
VBS.Crystal.vbs  
Crystal.vbs  
Crysta.vbs  
VBS.Dropper.Apop.vbs  
Beware.vbs  
VBS.Energ.vbs  
IIS-Worm.CodeRed.a.vbs  
VBS.Stress.vbs  
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Stress.vbs  
Stress Out.vbs  
VBScript.777.vbs  
VBS.777.vbs  
IIS-Worm.CodeRed.c.vbs  
Seven.vbs  
VBS.Vintageb.vbs  
sargo.vbs  
Jackal.VBS  
Osterhase.vbs  
MarkerC.vbs  
VBS.Trojan.Zirkov.vbs  
Trojan.Zirko.vbs  
pet_tick.vbs  
VBS.Hatred.b.vbs  
Hatred.b.vbs  
VBS.GaScript.vbs  
IRC-Worm.Freenet.VBS  
VBS.LostGame.vbs  
JS.Hatred.vbs  
VBS.Mesut.vbs  
VBS.Both.vbs  
VBS.Dropper.17th.vbs  
Crazzzy.b.vbs  
Renegy.vbs  
Fasan.vbs  
VBS.Yozisb.vbs  
VBS.Yozis.b.vbs  
thief.vbs  
Intended.Yozis.b. vbs  
VBS.Phybre.vbs  
I-Worm.Lee.o.vbs  
VBS.Simona.vbs  
Simona.vbs  
VBS.Voodoo1b.vbs  
VBS.Voodoo.b.vbs  
VBS.Vodoo.b.VBS  
VBS.Godog.vbs  
Falling.vbs  
vacuna.vbs  
VBS.Netlog.vbs  
JS.Internal.f.vbs  
VBS.Trojan.Cybers.vbs  
NoWarn.vbs  
HTML.NoWarn.vbs  
VBS.Trojan.Raptor.vbs  
Raptor V.vbs  
JS.Germinal.vbs  
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VBS.Voodoo.vbs  
VBS.Vodoo.VBS  
VBS.Exposed.vbs  
VBS.VbsDoc.vbs  
HTMLStertor.vbs  
VBS.Petik.vbs  
VBS.Trojan.Lava.vbs  
dome.vbs  
yourworm.vbs  
I-Worm.SSIWG.vbs  
VBS.Spaced.vbs  
VBS.SSIWG.vbs  
I-Worm.Sint.src.VBS  
VBS.Sflus.vbs  
Homepage.vbs  
JS.Lame.vbs  
Happy.vbs  
JS.Evil.vbs  
VBS.Coldape.vbs  
VBS.AVM.vbs  
VBS.Pocus.vbs  
VBS.Kremp.VBS  
VBS.Internal.vbs  
Rato.vbs  
fuckosama.vbs  
VBS.Lanus.vbs  
NEOKILLER.vbs  
VBS.Hatred. vbs  
Hatred.vbs  
VBS.Marata.vbs  
HTML.Internal.vbs  
AnnaK.vbs  
VBS.Weim.vbs  
VBS.RTFinfo.vbs  
VBS.Entice.vbs  
Entice.vbs  
WBS.Simple.VBS  
Crazzzy.vbs  
VBS.Jertva.vbs  
JS.Optiz.vbs  
VBS.Gum.vbs  
VBS.Infi.vbs  
madafaka.vbs  
Infi.vbs  
VBS.Mb.c.VBS  
VBS.Madafaka.vbs  
Infi.b.vbs  
Xxx.vbs  
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VBS.Xxx.VBS  
VBS.Trojan.Alal.vbs  
Eraser.vbs  
JS.Funtime.vbs  
Simple.vBS  
VBS.MailTest.vbs  
Yovp.vbs  
VBS.Internalc.vbs  
VBS.Internal.c.vbs  
Internal.vbs  
JS.vbs  
VBS.Eva.b.vbs  
Script.Inf.Demo. vbs  
VBS.Nobyl.vbs  
VBS.Eva.c.vbs  
IIS-Worm.BlueCode.vbs  
Script.Inf.Zox.c.vbs  
VBS.Lucky2.vbs  
VBS.Eva.vbs  
Eva.vbs  
Script.Inf.Zox.b.vbs  
VBS.Rabbit.a.VBS  
VBS.Rabbit.c.vbs  
VBS.Corrupt.vbs  
rabbitC.vbs  
Baby.vbs  
VBS.Trojan.Over.vbs  
Script.HE.Flys.b.vbs  
VBS.Rabbit.b.vbs  
rabbitB.vbs  
VBS.Rabbit.vbs  
rabbitA.vbs  
VBS.Brat.vbs  
VBS.Trojan.Destroyer.Trojan.vbs  
Fuck.vbs  
JS.DriveFormat.b.vbs  
VBS.Readme.vbs  
Chantal.vbs  
VBS.Pie.b.vbs  
Script.HE.Flys.vbs  
VBS.Trojan.Debor.vbs  
Bored.vbs  
Small.vbs  
VBS.Birgit.vbs  
VBS.First.e.vbs  
VBS.First.b.VBS  
Stuck.vbs  
JS.Fortnight.a.vbs  
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melissa.vbs  
Script.Inf.Zox.vbs  
 
 
 
 
Normal VBScripts 
zoom.vbs  
WSH__I386_SHOWVAR.VBS  
WSH__I386_SHORTCUT.VBS  
WSH__I386_REGISTRY.VBS  
WSH__I386_NETWORK.VBS  
WSH__I386_EXCEL.VBS  
WSH__I386_DELUSERS.VBS  
WSH__I386_CHART.VBS  
WSH__I386_ADDUSERS.VBS  
Write to a Custom Event Log Using EventCreate.vbs  
Write Events to the Local Event Log.vbs  
Write Events to a Remote Event Log.vbs  
Write Data to a Text File.vbs  
Win2kReleaseIPRenewIP.vbs  
viewpagefilesettings.vbs  
View System Restore Configuration Values.vbs  
View All Existing Restore Points.vbs  
Vier.vbs  
version.vbs  
Verify that a Folder Exists.vbs  
Verify that a File Exists.vbs  
Verify Signatures for All Scripts in a Folder.vbs  
Verify ChkDsk Volume Status.vbs  
VDirHits.vbs  
Vbstest21.vbs  
Vbstest2.vbs  
vbscript.vbs  
Using WMI to Enumerate Shortcuts on a Computer.vbs  
uservalid.vbs  
UserPrintQueues.vbs  
UserPrint.vbs  
UserLogon.vbs  
UserGroups.vbs  
UserFileAccess.vbs  
UserChangePassWord.vbs  
Use WMI to Enumerate Environment Variables.vbs  
Use Wildcards in File Queries.vbs  
Use Wildcards in a Folder Query.vbs  
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Use the Browse for Folder Dialog Box.vbs  
Use Recursion to Enumerate Subfolders.vbs  
Use a Text File as a Command Line Argument.vbs  
Use a Predefined Indexing Service Query.vbs  
Use a Free Text Search with the Indexing Service.vbs  
Upgrade Software.vbs  
update_ifl501.vbs  
update_ifl50.vbs  
update_icl501.vbs  
update_icl50.vbs  
update_data_mdb1.vbs  
update_data_mdb.vbs  
Update Records in a Recordset.vbs  
Update Printer Locations.vbs  
UnPauseWebServers1.vbs  
UnPauseWebServers.vbs  
UnPauseServers.vbs  
UnPauseFTPServers.vbs  
uninstall_admin1.vbs  
uninstall_admin.vbs  
UNIFLEX.VBS  
Uncompress Folders.vbs  
U111.VBS  
Transfer1.vbs  
Transfer.vbs  
Transfer Print Jobs to a Different Print Queue.vbs  
Track Script Progress Using Internet Explorer.vbs  
Track Script Progress in a Command Window.vbs  
Top20URIs.vbs  
TEXTMASK.vbs  
TestOcx2.vbs  
TestOcx1.vbs  
TestOcx.vbs  
testflds1.vbs  
testflds.vbs  
test_script.vbs  
test.vbs  
Terminate a Process.vbs  
System Event Log Properties.vbs  
synciwam.vbs  
switchToSourceSafe.vbs  
Suppressing Windows Activation Notices.vbs  
Suppress Multiple Event Notifications.vbs  
submenus98.vbs  
StopWebServers.vbs  
stopweb.vbs  
stopsrv1.vbs  
stopsrv.vbs  
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stopservice.vbs  
StopServers.vbs  
StopFTPServers.vbs  
stopftp.vbs  
Stop the Indexing Service.vbs  
Stock.vbs  
StaticFilter.vbs  
StartWebServers.vbs  
startweb.vbs  
startsrv1.vbs  
startsrv.vbs  
startservice.vbs  
StartServers.vbs  
StartFTPServers.vbs  
startftp.vbs  
Start the Indexing Service.vbs  
standardPro8.vbs  
standardPro6.vbs  
standardPro5.vbs  
standardPro1.vbs  
standardPro.vbs  
standard.vbs  
sssadmin7.vbs  
sssadmin6.vbs  
SSSADMIN3.VBS  
SSSADMIN2.VBS  
SSSADMIN1.VBS  
sssadmin.vbs  
SrcSafe.vbs  
SPLINELOGO.vbs  
SPINIE.vbs  
sp500w98pcmciab001.vbs  
SMap_Topframe.vbs  
SMap_Menu.vbs  
SMap_MainCode.vbs  
SMap_LinkCode.vbs  
Skin_18.vbs  
Skin_17.vbs  
Skin_16.vbs  
Skin_13.vbs  
Skin_12.vbs  
Skin_11.vbs  
Skin_1.vbs  
SIM100_Shared1.vbs  
SIM100_Shared.vbs  
sign.vbs  
Sign All Scripts in a Folder.vbs  
Sign a Script Programmatically.vbs  
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shutdown.vbs  
Shut Down the Local Computer.vbs  
SHOWVAR3.VBS  
SHOWVAR2.VBS  
SHOWVAR1.VBS  
SHOWVAR.VBS  
show-ids1.vbs  
show-ids.vbs  
ShowAllRoutingRules.vbs  
ShowAllProtocolRules.vbs  
SHORTCUT3.VBS  
SHORTCUT2.VBS  
SHORTCUT1.VBS  
SHORTCUT.VBS  
SG-PRESERVE.vbs  
SG-DRAWINGSURFACE.vbs  
SetWebPubRuleHostHeader.vbs  
SetUpstreamRouting.vbs  
setup1.vbs  
setup.vbs  
SetTempPath.vbs  
SetEmailAlerts.vbs  
SetDefaultApplicationSettings.vbs  
SetCache.vbs  
set_rwin1.vbs  
set_rwin.vbs  
Set the Default Printer.vbs  
Set the Default Printer Based on Queue Length.vbs  
Set System Restore Configuration Values.vbs  
servicestopped.vbs  
SendText.vbs  
SendMail1.vbs  
SendMail.vbs  
Send Email without Installing the SMTP Service.vbs  
Send Email from a Script.vbs  
Security Log Properties.vbs  
SearchTree.vbs  
search_for_emails.vbs  
search_for_addresses.vbs  
Search the Indexing Service.vbs  
Search for Specific Printers.vbs  
Search for Published Folders.vbs  
Search for Computer Accounts.vbs  
SCROLLSWITCH.vbs  
Script99.vbs  
Script5.vbs  
Schedule AutoChk.vbs  
Schedule a Task.vbs  
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RUNNERS.vbs  
Run ChkDsk.vbs  
Returning Active Directory System Information.vbs  
Return a Disk Drive Collection.vbs  
Retrieving the Default WMI Namespace.vbs  
Retrieve USB Hub Information.vbs  
Retrieve USB Controller Information.vbs  
Retrieve Time Zone Information for a Computer.vbs  
Retrieve the Internet Explorer Connection Summary.vbs  
Retrieve the Display Controller Configuration.vbs  
Retrieve System Information.vbs  
Retrieve Summary Information for a File.vbs  
Retrieve Specific Events from an Event Log.vbs  
Retrieve SMBIOS Information.vbs  
Retrieve Shadow Copy Settings.vbs  
Retrieve SCSI Controller Information.vbs  
Retrieve Print Queue Statistics.vbs  
Retrieve Portable Battery Information.vbs  
Retrieve Port Resource Information.vbs  
Retrieve PCMCIA Controller Information.vbs  
Retrieve Operating System Properties.vbs  
Retrieve Motherboard Device Information.vbs  
Retrieve Modem Information.vbs  
Retrieve Memory Array Information.vbs  
Retrieve IP4 Route Table Information.vbs  
Retrieve Internet Explorer File Version Information.vbs  
Retrieve Internet Explorer Connection Settings.vbs  
Retrieve Internet Explorer COM Object Settings.vbs  
Retrieve Internet Explorer Cache Settings.vbs  
Retrieve Information About Mapped Network Drives.vbs  
Retrieve Information About Binary Files Used by an Application.vbs  
Retrieve IDE Controller Information.vbs  
Retrieve Folder Properties.vbs  
Retrieve Floppy Controller Information.vbs  
Retrieve File Version Information.vbs  
Retrieve File Properties.vbs  
Retrieve Extended File Properties.vbs  
Retrieve Events For One Day from an Event Log.vbs  
Retrieve Detailed Summary Information for a File.vbs  
Retrieve Current Display Configuration.vbs  
Retrieve Computer Fan Information.vbs  
Retrieve Command Line Arguments from an Active Directory Co.vbs  
Retrieve Command Line Arguments from a Text File.vbs  
retrieve CACHE MEMORY information.vbs  
retrieve BIOS information.vbs  
retrieve battery information.vbs  
Retrieve All Events from an Event Log.vbs  
resumeservice.vbs  
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Resume the Indexing Service.vbs  
Resume Print Jobs.vbs  
Resume All Paused Printers.vbs  
Resume a Paused Printer.vbs  
RestorePointXPCleaner1.vbs  
RestorePointXPCleaner.vbs  
restart1.vbs  
restart.vbs  
restart a computer.vbs  
resource2_h.vbs  
resource1_h.vbs  
resource_h.vbs  
reseta computer account password.vbs  
Report Print Queue Statistics.vbs  
Rename Folders.vbs  
Rename Files.vbs  
Rename a Printer.vbs  
Rename a Printer Published in Active Directory.vbs  
Rename a Folder.vbs  
Rename a File.vbs  
rename a computer account1.vbs  
rename a computer account.vbs  
remove.vbs  
remove sw.vbs  
Remove an Indexing Service Scope.vbs  
Remove an Indexing Service Catalog.vbs  
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